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Abstract
Despite the creation of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) more
than 30 years ago, the construction industry is in conflict with itself. It is locked in a
struggle to effectively keep its workforce protected from unsafe acts, unsafe conditions,
or a combination of both. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), nearly 6.5
million people work at approximately 252,000 construction sites across the United States
every day, with the fatal injury rate for the construction industry higher than the national
average when compared to all industries. There have been many studies documenting
these conditions, but no study has examined leadership styles and their impact on the
climate of safety. This study examined the relationship between management’s leadership
style and the perception of a climate of safety; the relationship between workers’
perception of leadership style and the perception of a climate of safety; and the
relationship between the size of the workforce, the manager’s leadership style, and the
perception regarding the climate of safety. The outcomes contribute to the field of
conflict resolution as they offer the ability to move from incongruities regarding
perceived worker safety to discussions and solutions that are aimed at influencing those
policies and procedures at the organizational level that will ensure that a construction
worker can perform his or her job free from dangerous work conditions.

xii
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The construction industry has long been recognized as hazardous (Chen & Jin,
2012; Cooper, 2000; Dester & Blockley, 1995). Nearly 6.5 million people work at
approximately 252,000 construction sites across the United States, and, according to the
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (2012), approximately 17% were construction
workers who became catastrophically or fatally injured because of unsafe job site
conditions. This is the largest number of injuries incurred in any industry in America,
reflecting a fatal injury rate that is higher than the national average across all industries
(Occupational Health and Safety Administration [OSHA], 2005).
The objective of this study is to explore underlying factors that may contribute to
workplace injuries by examining the leadership styles, organizational size, and whether
workers and managers are in agreement regarding perceived climate of safety. While not
expected to have a working knowledge of safety practices, or the ability to analyze data
to ensure that the most effective and efficient safety practices are best utilized, managers
do have a responsibility to protect their workers. They also should be familiar with the
latest advancements in the industry.
As an example, Teo, Ling, and Chong (2005) recognized that construction
companies are systemic in nature and as such, sensitive to shifts in organizational
paradigms that create a continuous need to balance production deadlines and worker
safety. This focus on the potential between these two organizational forces creates an
ongoing conflict between the management of time and the management of job site safety.
This systemic conflict is therefore a seminal missing link in safety supervision best
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understood as a struggle and an obstacle that must be understood and addressed. It has
historically manifested as management’s inability to effectively execute safety policies
and protocols as well as an unwillingness to recognize safety as a priority and emphasize
it as such when interacting with the frontline worker. Walton (1989) acknowledged that
management must recognize that the foundation of this organizational conflict is also
rooted in the reality that they (management) holds both the power and obligation
regarding worker’s behaviors. Therefore, it is vital for management at every level of the
construction industry to implement an unwavering dedication to the identification,
prevention, and administration of jobsite hazards, risks, and accidents by guaranteeing
that the correct benchmarks and goals are implemented with the sole purpose of
alleviating unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of both.
Another factor also drives organizational conflict, specifically relating to safety
hazards and resource allocation (Cervo, Allen, & Dyché, 2011). While large companies
have the ability to invest in the implementation of expensive safety management systems,
smaller companies have limited resources, which can often lead management to assume
that they lack the necessary ability to create, implement, and monitor a means of
formalized safety management. This can manifest in the lack of a dedicated personnel or
team devoted to worker safety. As a result, injuries and fatalities occur (Gillen, Baltz,
Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro, 2002). A lack of experience dealing with safety issues is also
problematic for small businesses. John Mendeloff (2006), Director of the RAND Center
for Health and Safety in the Workplace, argues this is the case because smaller
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companies may not possess the same level of knowledge, including different options in
management styles they relate to worksite safety.
As an example, Company A has 15 employees; 3 are in a supervisory position
with safety related responsibilities and the remaining 12 are skilled workers (carpenters,
plumbers, electricians, etc.) and general laborers. While this company recognizes safety
as a priority, only the 3 supervisors actively engage in trainings focused on keeping the
worker safe. In comparison, Company B also recognizes safety as a priority but has 150
employees, with 30 of them holding supervisory positions with safety related
responsibilities. The remaining 120 are skilled workers (carpenters, plumbers,
electricians, etc.) and general laborers. Understanding that safety must be a priority, 30
employees actively engage in trainings focused on keeping the worker safe.
In this scenario, both companies prioritize safety; both have supervisors actively
engaged in safety trainings used to increase their ability to keep the worker safe; but, as
articulated by Mendeloff (2011), Company B has 10 times the opportunities to learn,
implement, reinforce, and assess acquired safety related knowledge, whereas Company A
has only 3 times that amount. To this end, construction safety management and the ability
to keep the worker safe is impacted by company size.
Therefore, recent studies on workplace construction safety have emphasized the
need for an integrated safety management approach, which demands a recognition that at
the highest level of the systemic paradigm, (the construction industry), a recognition must
be made that the organizational conflict is real and based in a historical inability to
integrate macro-level directives such as policies and procedures into mezzo- and micro-
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level initiatives that keep the worker safe. For instance, Choudhry, Fang, and Mohamed
(2007) advocated for a multi-faceted paradigm, one that focused not only on the reaction
to accidents after they have occurred, but also strong proactive approaches such as hazard
identification and observation. These approaches are all rooted in a quantifiable
percentage of safety policies, protocols, and behaviors and have been instrumental for
bringing about the necessary organizational changes to support an enduring commitment
to safety.
Current Challenges to Worker Safety
Micro, mezzo, and macro levels and safety challenges
Recent studies on workplace construction safety have emphasized the need for an
integrated safety management approach involving macro, mezzo, and micro-level
directives. These studies all reflect a common theme of construction being an industry in
both crisis and conflict with a need to see the systemic disconnect not only mirrored in
the interdependent relationship between managers and workers, but also between the
industry as whole and those specifically tasked with keeping the worker safe. Caldwell
and Mays (2012) understood this and expressed it as a need to start at the broadest level,
the macro level, including policies and procedures that are found in the construction
contracts and subcontracts. When discussing the macro-level, it is important to note that
these forces are established at the highest level of the management hierarchy as a means
of creating a clear and concise blueprint upon which all safety decisions are implemented,
reinforced, and monitored. When operationalized correctly, these initiatives create a
strong systemic culture and climate of safety, thereby establishing an information loop
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between management and the worker. Much like interpersonal interactions, macro-level
relationships are based on communication. This communication becomes the foundation
upon which expectations are prioritized, as they are codified in writing with clearly
delineated outcomes, leaving no room for interpretation (Parboteeah and Kappa, 2008).
In turn, the mezzo level can be best understood as a framework where broad
macro level policies begin to take focus in an effort to manifest as explicit programs and
practices. At this level, construction safety practices are communicated to management
professionals with a specific range of expected deliverables. As a transitional stage, this
framework is often at risk for the greatest level of misunderstandings or
misinterpretations, leaving the worker at greater risk (Caldwell & Mays, 2012).
The micro level involves the worker who is at the greatest risk of harm and who is
impacted by this industry in organizational conflict. To that end, it must be built upon
strong macro and mezzo levels. All prior levels of safety initiatives are translated to the
worker at this level. In other words, the policy (macro) is expressed as a program
(mezzo) into day-to-day work tasks (micro). This progression is shaped by an
organizational structure that must be driven by a cohesive and codified approach that is
unilaterally adopted by the construction industry and is ultimately the best proactive
approach, that of a shared safety narrative that involves both a top down and bottom up
approach, giving the worker a voice (perception of safety) in the process, while still
acknowledging that safety must be codified, communicated, and enforced from the top
down as it relates to job site safety (Clarke, 2013).
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The complexity of construction safety management and the inclusion of multiple
trades and multi-organizational collaboration in the construction industry continue to
exist and, as a result, the presence of a high potential to systemically impede the creation
of an effective means of understanding the impact of management styles on the day-today activities that comprise climate of safety is also evident (Rowlinson, 2004). This can
be overcome with a commitment by the industry to encourage both managers and
workers to engage in simple surveys designed to better understand how the safety
information loop, that of a top down, bottom up approach is instituted, communicated,
and arguably most importantly perceived by the frontline worker (Zohar, 1980a;
Mohamed, 2003; Ng, Roger, & Yip, 2009; Lunt, Bates, Bennett, & Hopkinson, 2008).
These frameworks are instrumental for bringing about the necessary
organizational changes that support an enduring commitment to safety and the day-to-day
operationalization necessary to protect the worker. It is for these reasons that Choudhry et
al. (2007) advocate for a multi-faceted paradigm focusing on the strong proactive
approaches such as hazard identification and observation. Each of these is rooted in a
quantifiable percentage of safety policies, protocols, and behaviors from the macro to the
mezzo and ultimately in the day-to-day jobs carried out by the worker at the micro-level.
Therefore, the first step is to identify key personnel characteristics and attributes
including observable behaviors that promote safety, judicious responses to safety
issues, approaching safety proactively, and effective communication skills allowing
each to serve individually and collectively to enhance and support a strong climate of
safety. This is accomplished by a commitment by management to integrate reliable
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scales and measures as part of emerging construction safety management research
(Le Coze, 2013; Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000).
The 2007-2010 Recession and Safety Violations
Another factor that has impacted the climate and culture of safety is the most
recent economic downturn. The nationwide recession in the United States spanning the
period of 2007 to 2010 had a strong impact on the construction industry. Since the
construction industry is a cyclical process with episodic expansions and marked
contractions, the recession was an important factor impacting how the industry reacted to
worker safety. During this period, the immense decrease in overall construction projects
was often overlooked, leading to a distorted version of injuries, lost time, and worker
deaths. This distortion was driven by a focus on the frequency of accidents without fully
taking into account the severity of injuries, a misrepresentation of the safety narrative that
continues to persist in present day, creating a gap in understanding the true impact on the
lives on those injured at the job site (Mendeloff, 2006).
This is important since the industry uses the decrease in lost time injuries as a
benchmark to prove that it is adequately addressing safety issues. Unfortunately, this
logic is flawed since the loss of over 1.5 million jobs would offer a more realistic reason
for the decrease (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).
The construction industry is not getting safer, as is apparent in the most recent
report of The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015) documenting increases in the number of
fatal work injuries, the highest annual total since 2008. As such, the industry and those at
the highest levels of the managerial hierarchy should not approach safety management
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using preexisting models, but rather the focus should be on those that support new
research and insights that promote worker safety.
To that end, safety has been the focus of the industry, but acknowledgement as an
organization is not enough to address and solve the conflict as it has only been shown to
be a small part of the larger solution (Gillen et. al, 2002). Instead, macro and mezzo level
entities—specifically general contractors, sub-contractors, and safety supervisors—must
be supported by the industry to offer tangible means of operationalizing policy and
protocol at the executive level so that it may be put into day-to-day practice regarding
safety management (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016).
Management Styles and Safety Challenges
There are three general leadership styles that have been recognized across the
continuum of all areas of Occupational Safety and Health but have rarely been
applied to the construction industry. Guldenmund, (2007); Zohar, (1980a); Katz &
Kahn, (1978); Hammer, (1989); Gillen et. al., (2002); Demirkesen & Arditi, (2015); and
Cooper (2000) all agree that these are best reflected in the precepts of the autocratic
leadership style, participatory leadership style, and free rein leadership style.
Autocratic Leadership Style
The aforementioned researchers each found that in this model, there is one leader
who has complete command over his/her employees/team. Individual input is not part of
this model, nor is criticism of the way in which the person in charge decides is best to
“get the job done”. While some have argued that the advantage of this style is the ability
to make quick decisions leading to greater productivity, safety on the construction job site
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can be greatly undermined if decisions are not well thought out and driven by preplanning strategies, especially those safety policies mandated by the contract.
Participatory Leadership Style
The researchers each found that in this model, those in charge foster an
environment that encourages a sense of teamwork, with each member from the top down
and bottom up having the ability and responsibility to take part in the decision-making
process, with the ultimate decisions made by the leader after all opinions and ideas are
considered. Those in charge direct the workers regarding job tasks and expectations and
workers have the freedom to communicate any concerns or suggestions without fear of
negative repercussions. The advantages of this leadership style are reflected in an
increase in worker motivation and a willingness to accept top down decisions as they feel
they reflect their input. Critics argue it is too time-consuming. Yet, when worker safety is
the priority, this form of input from the worker has proven integral and in the event that a
decision needs to be made quickly to avoid immediate hazards, leadership still has the
ultimate power to do so.
Free Rein Leadership Style
The researchers each found that this model is built upon complete trust that the
worker will perform the job with little to no supervision. In traditional corporate settings,
this leadership style works only when the employees are skilled, loyal, experienced, and
intellectual. While the construction worker can be all of these things, safety is not
something that can be left solely to the worker, as top down, bottom up leadership often

10
includes certain expertise and access to high-level policies and procedures as well as the
construction contract that the worker does not possess.
While every worker deserves a work environment free of unsafe acts, unsafe
conditions, or a combination of both, the construction industry, unlike a traditional office
setting, poses greater safety related challenges (Wamuziri, 2007). The relationship
between culture and climate of safety and the role leadership styles play can be a
powerful analytical tool; yet to date, the exploration of relationships between
leadership style and a worker’s perceived notion of his/her climate of safety has
been sorely underutilized.
Significance of Study
For decades, the construction industry, as reflected in organizational
systemics, has failed to see itself as the key stakeholder and the agent of change
regarding worker safety. The industry has focused on applying technologies that
support outcomes regarding the estimating and overseeing of projects; yet in an
attempt to fully integrate these mechanisms, it has failed to address one of the most
significant aspects of the industry, worker safety (Niskanen, 1994). Project
management continues to impact the success or failure of a project, but if success is
to be defined by the industry as well as by individual construction companies only on
the basis of time, cost, or quality performance without making worker safety the first
priority, the true impact of the completion of any project lacks an integral dimension,
that of the relationship between leadership styles and climate of safety.
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This research takes a unique approach insofar as it endeavors to highlight new
ways in which to approach construction safety management by exploring the construction
industry’s need to realize it is both in crisis and conflict. This systemic dissonance
impacts management’s approach to worker safety based on perceived notions of climate
of safety by not only management, but also the worker. Therefore, by recognizing the
industry as part of ongoing organizational conflict, this holds it responsible not only for
the problem/conflict but more importantly as a key contributor to the facilitation of
potential solutions. This innovative approach fills the gap in the study of construction
safety by connecting the missing dots revealed in past research; specifically, by focusing
on the need for a proactive approach that includes the analysis of primary data, notably
that of those in charge of keeping the construction job site safe at the managerial level, as
well as those performing the daily work tasks (Smith, Foklard, Tucker, &
Macdonald.1998; Shapira & Lyachin, 2009; Parboteeah & Kapp, 2008; Niskanen, 1994).
This cannot be done from a strictly retroactive approach using broad strokes to
explain specific catastrophic and fatal injuries (Mohamed, 2003; Mattila, Rantanen, &
Hyttinen,1994). Instead, the important role both worker and management play in safety
outcomes is the ultimate goal; and while in no way predictive in nature, this research led
to increasing awareness and in turn offered greater options when deciding upon the most
effective and efficient means and methods to be utilized by management to protect the
worker from unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of both.
Managerial leadership styles are key to propelling the industry forward into a new
age of construction safety management. Management has a multi-faceted role, and as
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such, while there has been no lack of research focused on the goals of how those in
charge can utilize time and cost-saving methods, far less exists regarding proactive
safety approaches based on leading rather than lagging indicators (Tsui, A.S., Zhang,
Z.X., Wang, H., Xin, K.R., & Wu, J.B. 2006)
The research regarding the relationship between leadership styles and climate of
safety is still in its infancy, but it remains integral to the future of construction safety
management and the systemic approach to keeping the worker safe. There is no doubt
that by keeping safety systems healthy and responsive, they can appropriately adapt to the
changing needs of both the workplace and the workforce they are created to protect
(Clarke, 2013; Checkland,1997; Flin et al., 2000). To that end, the industry has an
organizational and systemic choice to make as it endeavors to offer more than simply
awareness of the need for worker safety, but also an active commitment to making safety
not merely an afterthought, but a driving force in all decisions across the construction
management continuum. This opportunity is in concert with those forces that drive the
field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, allowing for the emergence of an informed
industry that recognizes and values worker safety that acknowledges not enough is being
done to keep the worker safe. As the highest tier of the organizational hierarchy, it has the
greatest responsibility to establish and empower leaders/managers who are better
equipped to understand the needs of workers. This in turn allows for the creation of a
much-needed bridge between an industry focused on production driven outcomes that
cannot supersede the appreciation that with a clearer comprehension of workers’
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perception of climate of safety comes the potential for a reduction in workplace
conflict(s) as well as an overall diminution of safety related anxieties.
Statement of Problem
The construction industry can be hazardous (Chen and Jin, 2012; Cooper, 2000;
Dester and Blockley,1995). However, management has historically approached the issue
of safety assessment from a reactive nature such as safety updates, retraining, and recertifications. These assessments are a response to an accident rather than a means of
trying to prevent a new one from occurring (Celik & Cebi, 2009).
While there has been a small shift away from the reactive measures, the new
policies and standards, including OSHA’s confined spaces, fall prevention campaign, and
investigation and reporting reflect a historical focus on retrospective information or data
conventionally referred to as "lagging indicators” (Demirkesen & Arditi, 2015). This is
inadequate because historical data can only offer a snapshot into the climate of safety,
and in turn, accident causation as it relates to the worker, the construction milieu, and the
context surrounding the particularly hazardous environment (Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, &
Smith-Crowe, 2002; Celik & Cebi, 2009; Diaz & Cabrera,1997).
While the construction industry may not always agree regarding the means and
methods to effectively measure safety, for nearly two decades, setting safety goals and
measuring safety performance has continued to engender controversy and varying
opinions regarding the way in which safety outcomes should be expressed empirically.
To that end, it is important to point out that prior to the creation of OSHA,
American Nation Standards Institute (ANSI) Z16.1 put forth three distinct measures of
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injury experience: disabling industry frequency rate, disabling injury severity rate
(essentially a weighted frequency rate), and average days associated for disabling injury
(a measurement of the ratio of severity to frequency rates). In their simplest form, these
afforded the BLS the ability to collect, record, and code work injuries within each of the
categories. The goal was one that focused on creating a system based on uniformity.
Unfortunately, since reporting was voluntary, unlike mandatory reporting imposed by
OSHA, ANSI data was unable to produce an accurate accounting of both the quality and
degree of workplace injuries (Grayson, Althouse, Winn, & Klishis, 1998).
With the emergence of OSHA, many safety and health professionals have adopted
measures based on statistically driven formulas that in their simplest form are generated
by an empirical foundation that uses a base formula of 100 full-time employees per year
or 200,000 work hours to measure safety outcomes. This is simply not effective because
it does not take into account the frequency of accidents on a specific job site in
comparison to the severity of injuries that resulted. Trying to show that a company is
working more safely simply due to a decrease in frequency without taking into
consideration severity is misleading at best.
Take the fatality rates of two hypothetical companies. Company A reported 250
broken arms and 3 deaths for a particular year, while Company B reported 900 broken
arms with 0 deaths for that same time period. The following year, Company A reported
100 broken arms (a decrease of 150 broken arm incidents) and 15 deaths, while Company
B reported 925 broken arms (an increase of 25 broken arm incidents) and 0 deaths. The
industry would report, based on frequency, that Company A has recognized greater
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success in keeping the workers safe due the overall decrease in accidents. Yet, OSHA
incident rates were never intended to be utilized so exclusively. Time and again, OSHA
experts have explained that the United States government created OSHA for many
reasons, one of which was to build a very narrow window or “snapshot” of occupational
safety and health as it related to injuries in the workplace. Still, these guidelines were
never meant to give an accurate accounting of safety to the exclusion of all other data
sources. The industry would report and recognize that company A has recognized greater
success in keeping the worker safe due the overall decrease in accidents.
The study of any mass data reveals that the type of accidents, specifically ones
that results in temporary total disabilities, are far different from those that result in
permanent partial disabilities, permanent total disabilities, or death. This is the challenge
faced by construction safety management professionals today and in the future. It is also
the challenge faced by educators, as those entering into the workforce charged with the
responsibility of worker safety need to have a far greater understanding of lagging and
leading indicators and their relationship to the evaluative process of construction safety
management. Therefore, lagging indicators tend to be highly ineffective as they only
address the root cause after the injury has occurred rather than focusing on the leading
indicators or those that keep the worker safe (Shapira, A., and Lyachin, B. 2009).
The movement away from what has been traditionally deemed a "feedback”
model in construction safety management to that of a "feed-forward" still remains
misunderstood. Furthermore, the “feed-forward” model has been applied incorrectly. For
example, an electrocution of a worker would be a lagging indicator as it has already
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occurred, whereas an inspection of the jobsite for hazards related to electrocution would
be a leading indicator, reflecting a pre-incident measurement. Subsequently, safety
management initiatives must be laser focused and built upon outcome-oriented tasks,
which can be easily integrated into an already existing management structure. Equally
important, workers must be involved in safety management in order for the system to
function properly. This integrated safety management or programs are based on proven
outcomes that work because they involve the worker in the problem-solving processes,
thus allowing for an increase in safety behaviors which support a top down/bottom up
approach to safety (Zohar, 1980a; Zohar, 1980b).
Need for Study
The importance of this study is in its focus on indicators that transcend decades of
awareness building regarding job site safety on the part of the construction industry as
well as macro-level systemic rhetoric that alludes to the need for management to have the
information to employ effective and efficient proactive safety monitoring strategies,
rather than relying on lagging indicators to predict workplace safety that does nothing to
further the necessary safety narrative to make this a reality. As discussed, this is
accomplished by examining the potential impact of the relationship between
management’s leadership styles and their perception of the climate of safety as well as
those of the worker. While previous studies have demonstrated a strong connection
between leadership styles and performance outcomes, no one in the construction industry
has taken the initiative to look specifically at the perception of both management and the
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worker by applying the same quantitative scales and measures (Bogdanov, 1980; Brown
& Holmes, 1986; Cervo, Allen, & Dyché, 2011; Diaz & Cabrera,1997).
By examining these factors, construction safety management is taken in a new
and necessary direction with the focus of finding the relationships between proactive
approaches and keeping the worker safe. Owing to the multi-faceted nature of the
construction industry and the polycentric construct especially found on the multiemployer worksite, research must focus on the interplay between the various entities
responsible for safety.
To that end, it is important to understand the basic underpinning of The MultiEmployer Doctrine governing the construction worksite (Fonte & Griffin, 2012). It is
defined as any jobsite consisting of more than one employer and as such, on these
jobsites the Prime Contractor, General Contractor or any other employer or a mixture
thereof can be cited for a hazardous condition that violates an OSHA standard. Under the
law, “General contractors can be held liable for OSH Act violations even if they did not
create or expose their own employees to the hazard” (OSHA, 2016) 29 C.F.R.
§1910.12(a)). This provides in part, that “each employer shall protect the employment of
each of his employees engaged in construction work by complying with the appropriated
standards’" (Fonte & Griffin, para. 5).
The construction industry has not ignored worker safety, but it has relied upon
outdated modes of measuring the efficacy of models of intervention, training, and an
overall change across the continuum of occupational safety and health regarding primary
data sources, leading indicators, and the construction job site being systemic in nature
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(Jackson, 2001), leaving each part highly susceptible to influence and impact by those
other parts that make up the entire system.
Research Questions
This purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the climate of
safety as it relates to leadership style. Specifically, three areas of focus are of interest:
management’s leadership style and perception of climate of safety; worker’s perception
of leadership style and the climate of safety; and the interaction between size of the
workforce, the manager’s leadership style, and their perception regarding the climate of
safety. These research questions were:
Is there a relationship between management’s leadership style and perception of
climate of safety?
Is there a relationship between worker’s perception of leadership style and climate
of safety?
Is there a relationship between the size of the workforce, the manager’s leadership
style, and their perception regarding the climate of safety?
The researcher hypothesized that those leaders who engage in a more
participatory leadership style will be more attuned to climate of safety when compared to
autocratic leaders. He also believed that those workers who perceived their supervisors
to engage in a more participatory leadership style would have a perception of a stronger
climate of safety than those who ascribed to either an authoritarian or free rein style.
Furthermore, he believed that company size would impact the perception of climate of
safety on the part of both the supervisor and worker.
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Definition of Terms
There are several terms utilized throughout this dissertation that are important to
explain.
Culture of safety. When defining a culture of safety, specifically as it pertains to
the construction jobsite, it is not a single construct, but instead a top down/bottom up
approach consisting of shared organizational beliefs, policies, and procedures that have
been codified at the macro level. Culture of safety is the construct that ultimately shapes
management and employee behavior.
Climate of safety. While a subpart of culture of safety, climate of safety is
experienced at the mezzo and macro levels, as it is the means by which management
operationalizes the constructs of culture of safety.
Construction safety management. Construction management in its simplest
terms is a safety profession specifically targeted to address the multi-faceted issues
reflected in the planning, design, and overall process at the construction work site. Those
professionals in the field are charged with addressing safety policies and protocols by
supplying management support and specific knowledge and proficiencies necessary to
keep the worker and workplace free from unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a
combination of both. While a set of systematic project checks and balances are utilized to
manage the business side of a construction project, specifically those of cost, scope of
work, quality of work, and time management, workplace and worker safety are meant to
be of equal priority and a cohesive component of all safety and health related facets of the
process.
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Outline of Dissertation
This dissertation is separated into six distinct chapters plus appendices. The first
chapter offers a short overview of the construction industry as highly hazardous and as
such, requiring further exploration, specifically regarding workplace safety and its
relationship to climate of safety as seen through the lenses of management’s leadership
styles and perception of climate of safety at both the macro and micro levels, the research
methodology, the problem statement, and the research questions.
Chapter Two provides a historical context regarding labor relations in the United
States as a means of creating a better understanding of the emergence of construction
safety and the role of both management and the front-line worker in keeping the jobsite
free of unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of both. Chapter Three outlines a
comprehensive review of established literature on the topic and also highlights notable
disparities in the breadth and scope of the research. This chapter also advances two
theoretical frameworks: Marxism and Systems Theory. These theories provide a deeper
insight into the important role construction management plays, the need for it to be
looked at in its totality, the socio-political and economic paradigm, and finally the
systemic construct operating from a top down and bottom communication loop.
To that end, Marxist ideology as a philosophical, socio-economic, and political
paradigm is an amalgamation of the ideas of founders Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
For the purposes of this research, Marxism allows for an opportunity to explore an
industry in conflict with itself as it strives to keep the worker safe while still realizing a
profit. (Elling, 1989).
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Equally important is that of systems theory, which is also applicable to this
research. Systems theory is based on the premise that information is to be understood in
the context of the totality of all the parts and not a process of segmentation (Jackson,
2001). This is especially relevant today within the construction industry as it looks at
ways to integrate the whole versus the parts challenge manifested during the last century
(Meadows, 2008). Chapter Four outlines the research methodology for this study. This
also includes a thorough explanation of the means and methods by which the researcher
performed the quantitative study, including how the data was collected and analyzed as
well as any ethical issues resulting from the research. The analysis was conducted with
the aid of SPSS to calculate statistical data, including both descriptive and inferential
statistics. Equally important, it allowed for the analysis of inferential statistics by means
of the Chi-Square and, where applicable, Cramer’s V. The researcher also explored any
statistically relevant outcomes based on the demographical information acquired as a
means of verifying if this information has any bearing on leadership styles and perceived
climate of safety.
Chapter Five advances the results from the surveys allowing for an understanding
of the significance of my hypothesis and also discussed results in detail as they relate to
the research, with Chapter six offering a broader overview of these outcomes to include
any proposed limitations as well as offering recommendations for future research and the
possible impact on construction safety policies.
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Chapter 2: Context of Labor Movement
This research endeavored to explore the impact of leadership styles on the
perceived climate of safety in the construction industry. Therefore, it was necessary to
investigate from a historical perspective the interaction of labor and management in
America. Understanding the past as it relates to the present conflict within the
construction industry to keep the worker safe underscores that this century-old issue
continues to impact the industry today.
The phenomenon of organized labor in the United States is an amalgamation of
workplace safety, workplace conditions, labor laws, and socio-political paradigms.
Organized unions, as well as more loosely formed federations and worker groups, have
historically emerged, evolved, disagreed, and competed for a position in the marketplace
against the backdrop of an ever-changing society that was constantly looking to balance
profits versus safety.
While there exist variations on the theme, the majority of the research on labor’s
history in the United States, and the ensuing union movement, has included the concept
of solidarity as a common thread. Dionne (2010) noted that the values of the emerging
sense of solidarity within the workforce became increasingly alien to the American
culture. Fraser and Gerstle (1990) echoed these sentiments, recognizing the enigmatic
nature of labor culture in the Americas. While most industrialized nations had labor
movements that reflected sponsorship by their own unique and distinct political entities,
the U.S. remained a noticeable exception. In this country, labor unions acted as the
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epicenter of what came to be known as the New Deal Coalition, remaining at the
forefront of national politics from the 1930’s well into the 1960’s (Littler, 1982).
As early as 1890, scholarly literature regarding organized labor tended to place
great importance on the emergence of structure within the workforce. By 1960, the social
sciences had garnished a great deal of interest within academic circles. As such, a
movement away from organizational structure and towards that of the lived experiences
of the worker, including that of gender and race, was termed "the new labor history"
(Brody, 1993, pp. 111-126).
Organized Labor and the Law
By the mid-1800’s, the United States labor force was undergoing an immense
change. Although the Industrial Revolution modernized the workforce, it was not until
the influx of a large-scale transatlantic migration into the coastal cities created a larger
population of potential laborers, which in turn allowed controllers of capital to invest in
labor-intensive enterprises on a larger scale (Montgomery, 1980). Craft workers found
that these changes launched them into competition with each other to a degree that they
had not experienced previously, which limited their opportunities and created a
substantial risk of downward mobility that had not existed prior to this time (Tomlins,
2010, p. 112).
Across the continuum of the first half of the 19th century, there was a shift in
worker’s rights with a common theme reflected in a newly recognized sensitivity towards
that of the workforce and whether the workers would be supported in utilizing their
power collectively to obtain better working conditions, benefits, fair wages, appropriate
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working hours, and an overall more accommodating workplace (Bowles & Ginitis, 1976).
This power, impossible to be realized on the individual level, could be obtained utilizing
the construct of solidarity noted in the literature as collective bargaining power.
Therefore, prior to the history-changing decision in the case of Commonwealth v.
Hunt, which effectively legalized the formation of unions, collective bargaining and
organized labor movements had almost no power based on legal precedent and fear of
legal repercussions (Nelles, 1932). The Hunt case changed the solidarity movement
forever. The case made labor collectives legal and enabled the workforce to bind together
in support of a systemic and cultural shift, specifically by recognizing the role of the
worker as a part of the decision-making process regarding the work performed and the
way in which tasks were operationalized. This was appropriately summarized in a
statement made by economist Edwin Witte (1926), who indicated that “the doctrine that a
combination to raise wages is illegal was allowed to die by common consent. No leading
case was required for its overthrow” (p. 827). While Hunt was not the first case to
recognize labor collectives and labor unions as legal entities, the case was in fact the first
to do so with a sense of unrivaled clarity by creating a platform for legal precedent,
allowing for arguments to be upheld by the courts in support of the creation of labor
unions (Brody, 1993).
The Rise of Federations and Labor Unions
Founded in 1866, The National Labor Union (NLU) is recognized as the first
national labor federation in the United States. In direct competition with the National
Labor Union, the more inclusive and forward-thinking Order of Knights of St. Crispin,
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founded in 1867, documents more than 50,000 members by 1870, making it the largest
union of its time in the country. This organization was also unique insofar as it
recognized women in its membership under the auspices of Daughters of St. Crispin,
which was recognized statistically as comprising 10 percent of the union's total
membership by 1886 (Kessler, 2003).
These early efforts by the workforce to find strength in an organizational structure
were often unsuccessful because of infighting and an inability on the part of coworkers to
transcend the mindset of tradesmen. They were also unable to move forward to a more
macro-level thought process, which would be categorized today as upper and middle
management. While many of the early federations did not realize their organizational
goals, the Knights of Labor in 1869 became the first representation of effective labor
organizations to embrace a regional model of membership. The core manifesto focused
on the unity and best interest of all involved in the production of goods, and the
organization reflected a unique change in the focus of such groups by realizing not only
laborers, but anyone who fell under the broader umbrella of producer (Cohen, 1979).
The Federation of Organized Trade and Labor Unions was established in 1881
under the direction of Samuel Gompers. Like its predecessor, it was a cooperative of
multiple unions that did not have a membership. Instead, it utilized the power of
organized strikes to improve worker conditions and the uniformity of wage scales
(Montgomery, 1980). Whereas this Federation made some strides in realizing favorable
legislation, the degree of success in organizing and creating new unions was minimal. In
1886, an already tenuous relationship between the trade union movement and the Knights

26
of Labor became so strained, a convention was called on December 8th of the same year,
focusing on the realization that their collective power far outweighed their individual
means. As such, they formed a new organization known as the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) (Gildemeister, 1981).
Organized Labor Between 1900 -1920
Although the standard of living between 1900 and 1920 for the American
workforce was higher in comparison to Europe during the same period, there was still
social unrest. Australian historian Peter Shergold (1982) confirmed these findings in a
study in which he compared wages and standard of living in Pittsburgh with Birmingham,
England. His findings revealed that:
After taking into account the cost of living (which was 65% higher in the US.),
The standard of living of unskilled workers was about the same in the two cities,
while skilled workers had about twice as high a standard of living. The American
advantage grew over time from 1890 to 1914, and there was a heavy steady flow
of skilled workers from Britain to industrial America. Skilled Americans did earn
higher wages than British, yet unskilled workers did not, while Americans worked
longer hours with a greater chance of injury and had fewer social services (p. 61).
Weaknesses of Organized Labor, 1920- 1929
Despite the fact that the labor movement had made great strides leading up to the
1920’s, the next decade reflected a noticeable overall decline. The decline resulted in a
marked decrease in union membership, as well as involvement of union members in
affiliated activities. It is interesting to note that, although during this period there was
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economic prosperity, weak leadership within the movement and a growing prominence of
anti-union beliefs on the part of employers, along with macro-level government entities,
deeply undermined the union’s ability to remain cohesive. One major decline was the
number of workers participating in strikes. In 1919, over 4 million workers representing
21% of the workforce participated in over 36,000 strikes. By 1929, only 289,000 workers
representing only 1.2% of the workforce participated in only 900 strikes (U.S. Bureau of
the Census, 1976).
The 1920’s were also marked by a noticeable absence of strong leadership within
the labor movement. William Green, the Secretary-Treasurer of the United Mine Workers
who took on the leadership role of the American Federation of Labor after the death of
Samuel Gompers, was not well received. As a result, the AFL reflected a sharp decrease
in membership, having less than 3 million members in 1925 after a peak of 4 million in
1920 (Wright, 2003). With this decline in the strength of union confederations, individual
employers across the nation galvanized their forces in a highly successful campaign
against unions which came to be known as the American Plan. The American Plan
"sought to depict unions as alien to the nations individualistic spirit" (Sloane & Witney,
1997, p. 70).
Despite the aforementioned decline in the labor movement, the Great Depression
breathed new life into the idea of the collective bargaining power of the worker and the
ability for an organized workforce to establish a more integral role in both workplace
conditions and worker safety.
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Organized Labor, 1929-1955
With the crash of the stock market in October 1929, the Great Depression
produced an unprecedented unemployment rate of 25% (Smith, 2006). Understandably,
there was also a sharp decline in union membership, and in turn, union influence over the
workplace, as the labor force simply could not afford dues. In the throes of such
economic despair, one might expect the workforce to take a more radical approach to
change. One such option would have been to rise up against what was deemed the
capitalistic system that was oppressing them. In reality, while some workers did move
toward a more radical approach (that of the Communist Party), the majority of workers
did nothing, feeling an overwhelming sense of powerlessness (Smith, 2006). During this
period, there was a marked increase in Communist and Socialist sentiments,
organizations that strove to galvanize "unfocused neighborhood militancy into organized
popular defense organizations" (Zieger, 1994, pp. 11-19).
With the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, President Herbert Hoover
supported this pro-union bill. His action sparked a move toward structured policies and
procedures that protected against unfair court injunctions during the course of labor
disputes (Cohen, 1979). The Act also recognized the need to protect both middle
management as well as the front-line worker. More importantly, it signaled a systemic
change in United States public policy since collective bargaining power of workers was
in direct contrast to, and sorely undermined by, the court system prior to the Act.
Essentially, the judiciary did not recognize the importance of protecting the American
workforce (Sloan & Witney, 1997). When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt took
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office on March 4, 1933, there was a sense of urgency to address the ramifications of this
economic crisis and a commitment to change. This new impetus was seen in the creation
and implementation of the National Industry Recovery Act, which once again
undermined the importance and judicial support of the workers’ right to organize under
the auspices of the union (Wright, 2003). Though it did provide for worker safety, better
working conditions and increased wages, the most important outcomes were the
revitalization and recognition of both the need and legality to allow workers to leverage
their collective strength. Specifically, it acknowledged that, “employees shall have the
right to organize and bargain collectively through representative of their own choosing,
and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers” (Smith, 2006,
p.104).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 was ultimately found unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in 1935 and was replaced by the Wagner Act. This new act played an
important role in the history of the American workforce, especially at a time when the
economic future of the country was in question. Furthermore, the Norris-LaGuardia Act
of 1932 supported the concept of power in numbers and of recognizing a responsibility to
the worker, as well as a worker's right and responsibility to play an active role in
decisions being considered by the employer, which had a direct impact on workplace
safety. Specifically, it was the first time the federal government utilized its power and
over-sight as a means of protecting and adjudicating employer-employee arguments and
as an integral means of mitigating unlawful behavior against workers (Gildemeister,
1981).
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Its core concepts fostered collective bargaining and defended the theory and
practice of freedom of association. It also defined and prohibited five unfair labor
practices by employers, including interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
against their rights; Interfering with the formation of a labor organization; discriminating
against employees to encourage or discourage forming a union; discriminating against
employees who file charges or testify; and refusing to bargain collectively with the
employees’ representative (Schilling, M. S., M. A. Mulford, et al. 2006) .
The AFL was not without its opposition. This was demonstrated in the creation
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) on November 9, 1939, reflecting
dissent from eight international unions already belonging to the AFL. Both the CIO and
AFL experienced unprecedented expansion in membership during the period of unrest
among workers during the Great Depression, but did not always agree on how to meet the
needs of the working class.
The contention between the two groups was often acrimonious. On September 10,
1936 in a show of power, the AFL unilaterally revoked all CIO unions, undermining the
ability of the group to meet the needs of all workers in all industries. The CIO saw great
change in 1938 when they made the decision to cut ties with the AFL, forming an
autonomous labor federation aptly named the Congress of Industrial Organizations. This
choice reflected the CIO’s central ideals regarding an effective and equitable organization
of the United States labor movement. Additionally, there was an inclusive stance
regarding the needs of industry-based workers.
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While the AFL and the CIO were adversaries for close to two decades, with each
calling for the other to disband and become part of the other, the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947 deeply undermined the CIO, with many leaders seeing the McCarthyism as
invasive. This legislation can only be understood against the backdrop of the Cold War.
Taft-Hartley, passed by a Republican Congress over President Truman's veto in 1947,
harnessed the powerful psychological belief that a Communist influx would lead to a
destabilization of the United States’ national security as a justification for rolling back
many of the advantages labor had gained in the 1935 Wagner Act. Most of the bill's
provisions—banning closed shops, secondary strikes, and the spending of dues for
political purposes, while allowing states to pass union-busting "right to work" laws—had
no Cold War purpose. They represented a long-stymied pro-business Republican agenda
that had suffered under FDR's New Deal administration (Bruns & Schlesinger, 1975).
These anti-labor provisions caused labor leaders, and even Truman himself, to denounce
Taft-Hartley as a “slave labor bill” (Holmlund, 2004) that was parlayed by Republicans
as integral to national defense due to the threat engendered by the Cold War.
To that end, Taft-Hartley targeted Communists within the labor movement by
demanding union officials sign affidavits asserting they were not members of the
Communist Party. Any union that refused to sign lost all rights to a hearing before the
National Labor Relations Board, retracting any protection under federal law (Leebaert,
2002). The CIO’s unwillingness to swear that they held no ties to the Communist Party
weakened the cause and both internal and external pressures forced them on December 4,
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1955 to rejoin the AFL, forming a restructured body known as the American Federation
of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) (Zieger, 1994).
World War II had a dramatic impact on union membership:
There was a marked increase from 8.7 million in 1940, to over 14.3 million in
1945, representing approximately 36% of the overall workforce. While this
reincarnation of unions was of importance, of equal interest was the emergence of
women factory workers. Both the AFL and CIO supported Roosevelt in 1940 and
1944 with an overwhelming 75 percent or more of their support reflected in votes,
millions of dollars of support, and tens of thousands of workers (Lichtenstein,
1982, pp. 301-307).
These improvements were due in part to the fact that those spearheading the labor
movement did not come from traditional families of privilege, and instead, mirrored the
lives of the general population (Lich & Barron, 1978). With the passage of the TaftHartley Act of 1947, closed shops became illegal. This historical event is especially
pertinent to this research, as it reflects recognition of the importance of contractual
agreements within the arena of labor related issues. With an acknowledgment of the
importance of unions, as well as an understanding of the need for nonunion entities, the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 allowed for the emergence of a labor force that would recognize
the socio-political importance of working within a set of guidelines. These guidelines
would not only potentially enhance the fiscal well-being of the employer, but also protect
the worker and allow for economic advancement of the labor force collectively at both
the macro and micro-levels
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Recent History, Post 1960
After the 1960s, the United States experienced an expansion in the public sector,
specifically in the area of labor unions. This rapid growth was due in part to secured
wages and highly sought-after pensions for members. It was also marked by a decline in
manufacturing and farming, manifesting in a spike of local government employment.
According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2010), "local government employment
quadrupled from 4 million workers in 1950 to 12 million in 1976 and 16.6 million in
2009" (n.p.). Yet from 2011 to the present, as a result of increased fiscal instability, the
public sector, and more specifically unions, again came under heavy scrutiny as both the
state and federal government tried to reduce the power and impact of unions to
collectively bargain (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012).
The history of the labor market, worker conditions, unions, federations, and
related institutions in the United States is well documented. As such, navigating the
complexities of real world economics was inherently more multifarious than that of
purely theory-based or academic modalities. Instead of simply exploring the often socioeconomic and perceived needs of macro level market systems, the real-time progression
and shifts of the United States labor force was manifested through an intricate and
interrelated web driven by the decisions, actions, and at times self-serving needs of
market members.
Subsequently, history has shown that the impact on the labor market does not
always respond immediately and as accurately as theorized due to fluctuating paradigms.
These paradigms are based on an equally fluid set of motivators. Propelled by a multitude
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of psycho-social forces driven by an employer’s desire for increased returns, history has
shown that the best interest of the worker is not always a priority.
The history of labor markets in the United States reflects a systemic reality that
supports the influence of market processes and of the distribution of both tangible and
intangible resources on workplace safety (Norton, 2001). Often tumultuous, the United
States’ labor markets have shown both an ability and resiliency in response to ever
emerging relationships between that of supply and demand. To that end, the labor
movement has achieved great strides in recognizing the cyclical nature of the workforce
as related to changes in settlement patterns within the United States (Kersten, 2006). In
turn, the navigation of precarious organizational and structural fluctuations as a result of
the frenetic pace imposed by technology, has led to issues impacting management ability
and commitment to worker safety.
Worker Compensation
It would be impossible to explore the connection between the history of
workplace safety and the ultimate creation of OSHA without also briefly discussing the
impact of worker’s compensation. With the rise of a recognition that workers have a right
to a safe job site, the concept for compensating those workers who were in fact injured
quickly became part of discussions regarding a need to create policies and procedures as
part of the overall structure for protecting the worker. Based on European best practices
within the safety arena, several states in the U.S. made an effort to recognize a
compensation system. While on the surface this might appear as yet another successful
step towards a cohesive safety management plan of action, organized labor was not
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swayed and demonstrated great opposition, claiming that attention to this issue focused
on reactive rather than proactive or preventative interventions. Although these ideas did
not garner the support that was initially hoped for, "insurance company safety experts
helped improve their client safety programs and the establishment of compensation gave
the safety movement a moral boost" (Lubove, 1967, pp. 278-279).
Early Federal Action
During the infancy of workplace safety and the creation of OSHA, the federal
government kept a relatively low profile. It was, however, not completely silent on issues
regarding safety and health. This lack of involvement did slow the movement by
undermining the real and implied importance and legitimacy of claims that worker safety
needed to be a priority from the top down, and as such, to be recognized in macro-level
initiatives. Of interest was the role of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, who quietly
and almost invisibly began to investigate and publish detailed studies of death and
disease, in what were deemed “dusty trades”, along with other health related topics. In
1910, the Bureau published a study by a labor law advocate, John B. Andrews, on the
horrors of phosphorus necrosis (“phossy jaw”), a “disfiguring and sometimes fatal
disease of the jawbone suffered by workers in the white phosphorous match industry”
(Doehring, 1903, p 44).
In 1913, the Federal Government took a more active role in labor relations when
Congress created the Department of Labor. One of its prime directives was the
improvement of working conditions. A Senate directive specifically “called on the newly
appointed Secretary of Labor, William B Wilson, to report on industrial diseases and
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accidents” (Congressional Record Vol. 51, p. 11395, as cited in MacLaury, 1981). At
Wilson's direction, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (formerly the US Bureau of Labor)
began the arduous process of collecting accident statistics on a regular basis, beginning
with iron and steel industries. This led to a gradual inclusion of what were deemed to be
some of the more hazardous workplaces, including other areas such as construction.
Wilson was unwavering in his efforts and was said to be driven by a mantra that
included, "into the maw of unhealthy occupations… the thing to do is to make the
unhealthy occupations healthy" (Wilson, 1914, n.p.)
With the need to balance the impact of World War I on the economy of the United
States, as well as continue the momentum on the health and safety forefront, Congress
created the Working Conditions Service. The service inspected war production sites,
advising companies how to reduce hazards, and helped states develop and enforce safety
and health standards. When the war ended, the Service was allowed to expire, but the
Labor Department ordered its records “saved for the time when public and legislative
opinion again shall have become focused upon the necessity for constructive organization
of this character” (U.S. Department of Labor, 1919, n.p.).
OSHA: A Brief History
The construction industry can be seen as an industry in conflict with itself as a
result of the actions, or lack thereof, between those dictating safety policies and
protocols, that of management and those impacted directly by them, and that of the
frontline worker. This was explored utilizing Marxist Theory and Systems Theory in the
context of Construction Safety Management to better understand the impact on the means
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and methods that have been utilized to meet minimum OSHA standards. OSHA is an
important construct in both theory and practice, as it is a large governmental agency and
part of a larger socio-political schema with a history of being understaffed and slow to
make changes. As such, it has not been in a position to keep the construction worker as
safe as originally hoped across the continuum of this multi-faceted industry.
December 29, 1970, marked an important turning point in workplace safety as it
was the day that President Richard Nixon signed the Williams-Steiger Occupational
Safety and Health Act into law. The Act gave the Federal Government the right and
authority to oversee and enforce safety and health standards for most of the country's
workers. The Act came out of a long and arduous legislative tug-of-war beginning in
1968 when President Lyndon Johnson endeavored to realize similar outcomes. Much like
the maturation of labor relations and the labor workforce, regulating workplace hazards
reflects a tumultuous history dating back to the late 19th century (MacLaury, 1981).
In 1870, the Massachusetts Bureau of statistics of labor highlighted the need for
legislation that would recognize, address, and have the means to correct unsafe acts,
unsafe conditions, or a combination of both in the workplace; specifically, those related
to poor ventilation. In 1877, "Massachusetts passed the nation’s first factory inspection
law. It required guarding of belts, shafts, and gears, protection on elevators, and adequate
fire exits" (Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1872, n.p.). This recognition of
worker safety prompted many other states to recognize worker safety issues and put forth
actions and legislation. While well intentioned, it was haphazard at best, and by 1899
some, but not all, states had established and adopted the need for factory inspections; 13
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mandated machine guarding, and 21 states recognized to differing degrees the need to
take into account health hazards impacting both the worksite and the individual worker.
OSHA and Labor Standards
The appointment of Frances Perkins in 1933 as Secretary of Labor marked a
continued commitment by President Roosevelt to include the highest level of government
in workplace safety and health policies and protocol. As part of Roosevelt's New Deal,
the Federal Government took on a greater role in protecting people at the jobsite. Most
specifically, the Social Security Act of 1935 made it possible for the U.S. Public Health
and Service Department to fund programs related to worker and industrial health by
allocating resources to state health departments. This remains relevant today,
underscoring that for workers to be protected, a collaboration between the Federal, State,
and local administrations must exist.
By 1960, this collaboration was recognized by the creation of Federal
Occupational Safety and Health requirements that were applicable across state lines, as
well as to a wide range of hazardous industries (U.S. Department of Labor, 1960). While
innovative, these new initiatives and regulations did not garner overwhelming popularity.
General industry felt that because there had been no public access to hearings, employers
in the labor industry as a whole had been ignored. In response, the federal government
convened and, upon reflection of the public outcry, formally announced and recognized
these issues. In October 1963, revisions were offered, in addition to public hearings in
March 1964 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1964).
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Early in 1969, the acknowledgment for the need of a more general approach to
job safety and health was also addressed at the highest levels of government. In 1965,
Congress enacted various laws in an effort to manifest further protection of workers.
These laws included the Service Contract Act of 1965 and the Federal Construction
Safety and Health Act of 1969. Both Acts offered the opportunity to fill the gaps to
further protect the worker; yet, it wasn't until the Nixon Administration that the power of
federal action was fully realized when the President presented his concept of a
comprehensive job safety and health program to Congress in August 1969 (Wright,
2003).
The Nixon Administration proposal offered a five-person board that would set
and enforce job safety and health standards. The Labor Department would be limited in
inspecting workplaces. Nixon emphasized the use of existing efforts by private industry
and state governments. The main federal concern would be with the health research and
education and training, and only secondary with direct regulation (MacLaury, 1981).
Opposition by Labor
Nixon's movement towards greater levels of regulation regarding workplace
health and safety were not supported by organized labor. In fact, unions were driven by a
strong belief that specific actions must be created to deal with workplace hazards. They
did not believe that this could be done under the Nixon proposal, and voiced strong
concerns regarding dangers related to the handling of chemicals. There were mixed
opinions. Yet out of these discussions and robust debates came comments and
commentary by Irving Selikoff (1970), who reflected on the suffering of construction
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workers who were disproportionately impacted by fatal injuries during the application of
asbestos insulation to buildings. In an effort to invigorate conversation rather than
conflict, and refusing to point a finger at any one group, he posed the question, “who
killed Cock Robin? No one… His has been an impersonal, technological death… We
have all failed” (as cited in MacLaury, 1981).
Despite disagreements, President Nixon was finally able to sign the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, creating OSHA and demonstrating the tangible
benchmark of an historical movement that first found its voice in the factories of
Massachusetts in the late 1800’s.
Period Between 1970-2017
The early 1970s reflected a new sense of competition within heavily unionized
industries. Due in part to deregulation in communications and transportation, as well as a
paradigm shift leading to industrial restructuring, America was forced to face a new
reality, one in which foreign goods were taking over the marketplace (Elling, 1989).
As the oligopolistic and highly regulated market structures began to fall apart, the
non-union workforce became an economic necessity in some markets (Leebaert, 2002).
Concession bargaining became a reality, forcing the once nearly un-wielding trade unions
to offer allowances by surrendering unionized pay scales and worker conditions. This
capitulation was seen as a necessary response to the Recession as a form of job security
(Dionne, 2010).
Moreover, with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the rise to power of an
anti-union administration changed the course of union and non-union relations forever:
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Between 1975 and 1985, union membership fell by 5 million. In manufacturing,
the unionized portion of the labor force dropped below 25 percent, while mining
and construction, once labor’s flagship industries, were decimated. By the end of
the 1980s, less than 17 percent of American workers were organized, half the
proportion of the early 1950’s (Rosenbloom, 1998, pp. 287-288).
To that end, the Age of Reagan saw a continued collective bargaining retreat as wageearning Americans were faced with declining living standards not experienced since the
Great Depression, leaving the union movement a weakened economic and political
influence on all fronts (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012).
From the end of the Reagan Era to the present, OSHA has been a major force in
shaping and reshaping the labor force (Bartel & Thomas, 1985). With a focus on
emergency response, President Clinton signed the Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act
of 2000, directing OSHA to amend its Bloodborne Pathogens (BBP) standard and codify
industry compliance. To fully implement the new law, OSHA published updates to the
Bloodborne Pathogens standard on January 18, 2001 in the Federal Register. The
revisions went into effect on April 18, 2001 and focused on the obligations of employers,
including additions to the exposure control and better record keeping regarding injury
rates (Bunn, Pikelny, Slavin, & Paralkar, 2001).
After the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, OSHA took on a pivotal role
in safeguarding the safety and health of responders at the World Trade Center site. These
attacks created a job site never experienced by the United States. Rescue workers, with
the task of the search and recovery of both survivors and the deceased, faced an
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extraordinary number of hazards. During the extensive demolition and cleanup, “OSHA,
the City of New York, labor unions, contractors, and other government agencies
collaborated to ensure that no other injuries or fatalities occurred during the dangerous
recovery operations” (Choudhry and Mohamed, 2007), p. 26).
On March 23, 2005, the BP Texas City refinery was the site of one of the worst
industrial disasters in recent U.S. history. The resulting explosion and fire killed 15
people and injured 180. The incident alarmed the community and resulted in financial
losses exceeding $1.5 billion (OSHA, 2012). After the incident, “OSHA conducted an
investigation and issued 301 egregious willful violations for which BP paid a $21 million
penalty” (OSHA, 2012).
An explosion in February 2008 left 14 employees dead with 39 others severely
injured at the Imperial Sugar Refinery in Port Wentworth, Georgia. This catastrophic
incident engendered the third largest fine in the history of OSHA – $8.7 million – for
safety violations identified at the company’s facilities in Port Wentworth, Georgia and
Gramercy, Louisiana (OSHA, 2009).
From 2008 to 2017, OSHA’s efforts address worker safety, but as is shown since
the Reagan Era, these efforts are largely from a reactive approach (Caldwell & Mays,
2012). More specifically, OSHA has addressed worker safety and has lobbied for
various Acts to protect the worker, but these come after catastrophic events and a
tremendous loss of human capital that no fines or penalties can ever recover (Leebaert,
2002).
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Conclusion
The legacy of labor relations in America is complex. Organized labor played a
significant role in shaping our society. At times, unions have obstructed the socioeconomic growth of the nation, and, at other times, have supported industrious
collaborations with management allowing for profitable innovation and the protection of
human capital. With a history mirroring larger systemic challenges, including racism,
sexism, and ageism, the labor movement is responsible for assisting immigrants, blacks,
and women to gain access to the American Dream.
While seen as an impediment toward economic progress by some small
businesses as a result of insistence upon rigid adherence to costly work-related
guidelines, the war on wages has created better pay and benefits enabling millions of
workers to join the middle class. As a result, the history of this labor movement in
America is as diverse as those it continues to represent.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
This section explores the present literature regarding the topic of safety across the
continuum of the construction industry and its impact at the macro, mezzo, and micro
levels. The importance of more effective means and methods related to construction
safety management is not in question. Proactive approaches aimed at moving the
industry forward in keeping the front-line worker safe have stagnated, and as such,
construction safety management and job site safety have become a cruel oxymoron. By
exploring a variety of sources on the topic, the impact of leadership styles on climate of
safety were reviewed, while simultaneously highlighting key concepts including those of
culture, safety, and climate of safety. Of further importance was an examination of what
present literature deems as a disconnect between an extensive expanse of quantitative
research on the topic, yet also a lack of reliable scales and measures that can be applied to
all areas of the industry; an industry that employs many unique trades, but still must
remain focused on means and methods that offer proactive solutions to ensure the worker
is protected from unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of both.
Of equal importance was the analysis of theoretical constructs, specifically those
of Marxism and systems theory, to help better understand why accidents occur, and how
to address the crossroads between utilizing theory to invigorate innovative and scalable
safety practices. Nearly 6.5 million people work at approximately 252,000 construction
sites across the United States on any given day (Occupational Health and Safety
Administration, 2005). The fatal injury rate from workplace accidents for the
construction industry is higher than the national average for all industries (OSHA, 2015).
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Construction is a Hazardous Industry
Construction is a hazardous industry. Even if workplace injuries are not fatal, the
results can be catastrophic, leaving the worker a paraplegic, quadriplegic, or manifesting
various other physiological, cognitive, and psychological challenges. OSHA has
identified Construction’s Fatal Four, the leading causes of worker deaths on construction
sites: falls, electrocution, struck by objects and caught-in-between (2015). The Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS), in their Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries 2012, “Fatal
Occupational Injuries By Industry and Event or Exposure” (OSHA, 2012), demonstrated
that approximately 17 percent, were construction workers, the largest number of fatal
workplace injuries nationally. In terms of the Fatal Work Injury Rate per 100,000 fulltime equivalent workers, the national construction industry was 9.9, or almost three times
that of the national all-worker injury rate of 3.4. (BLS, 2012).
Nationwide, as a result of the 2008 Recession having a strong impact on the
construction industry, the years between 2007 and 2010 saw a steady and substantial
decline in construction nonfatal lost time injuries, a decline of approximately 45%. With
the Recession coming to a close beginning in 2010 and the construction industry
beginning to rebound, the trend of declining lost time injuries halted between 2010-2012
with a slight increase of less than one-half of one percent (see Figure 1).

46

Figure 1. U.S. Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses.
Nationwide, between 2007-2009, the construction industry experienced a major,
substantial increase of nonfatal lost time injuries. However, from that year forward, the
industry experienced substantial shifts in the number of these injuries. Between 2009 and
2010, a decrease of approximately 140% occurred; and between 2010 and 2012, no such
similar accidents are reported to have taken place. This appears to be either a coding
error or, more probably, the result of the height from which accidents occurred.
Commercial buildings, warehouses, supermarkets, and box stores commonly have a roof
to interior floor height of 24 feet.
A graphic representation of this trend in construction nonfatal nationwide lost
time jobsite injuries involving fall through roof/fall through surface of existing opening,
26-30 feet, is shown below.
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Figure 2. U.S. Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Construction.
To that end, although safety has been the focus of the industry, acknowledgement
of the problem is not enough (Gillen, et. al., 2002). Instead, macro and mezzo level
entities, specifically general contractors, sub-contractors, and safety supervisors must
offer a tangible means of operationalizing policy and protocol at the executive level, so
that it may be put into day-to-day practice regarding safety management (OSHA, 2015).
The concept of work or safety climate, and how workers perceive the safety
climate of their workplace, was raised as an issue more than 20 years ago by Zohar
(1980). At the time, it was recognized that successful injury control programs are based
on strong management commitment to safety, including the status of safety officers
within the organization, worker training, regular communication between management
and workers, general housekeeping, and a stable workforce (Guo, Yiu, & Gonzalez,
2015). In his findings, Zohar (1980) discovered that factories reporting sustainable and
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successful safety programs were marked by a clear commitment on the part of
management to make safety protocol and practices a priority. This commitment was
manifested in numerous ways.
Specifically, in companies realizing consistently low-accident rates, macro level
management was repeatedly shown to take personal ownership in the creation,
implementation and sustainability of safety policies and procedures at regular and often
predetermined intervals, while the same level of commitment was noticeably lacking in
companies with higher accident rate.
Safety climate, considered a subset of overall organizational climate, was one way
of identifying characteristics that might distinguish between employers with high or low
injury rates (Coyle, Sleeman & Adams, 1995; Zohar, 1980). Prioritizing safety is not a
new concept for the construction industry, as it is accepted that workplace safety
programs, when conceptualized and implemented properly, improve workplace safety.
Hakkinen (1995) echoed this belief in her research on management’s role in training, for
example. This is further seen in the work of Chen and Jin (2012), where they showed the
importance of the interplay between management and workers to address job site safety,
finding that “such programs could also potentially enhance an organization’s safety
culture or climate” (pp. 805-817). This concept finds further support with Smith, Foklard,
Tucker, and Macdonald (1998), who stated support for the belief that “the basis for
acceptable safety performance is an established and robust safety management system
that provides the means for controlling and monitoring performance safety” (p. 217).
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Nearly two decades old, Climate of Safety still remains relevant to worker safety
(Shapira & Lyachin, 2009). When first introduced into mainstream construction safety
management, it was understood that successful injury control needed to be rooted in
making safety a priority. This can only be accomplished when workplace safety, safety
management, and safety climate are measured. Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991)
specifically focused on finding ways in which to measure safety climate; they found that
by converging on worker safety, incident rates could be decreased if the goal of the
policies and procedures were specifically aimed at the micro/worker level. Gillen,
Faucett, Beaumont, and McLoughlin (1997) showed interest in the construction industry
by taking a focused look at nonfatal falls and their correlation to safety management
issues. Matilla, Rantanen, and Hytinnen (1994) and Brown and Holmes (1986) also
explored the effectiveness of safety climate scales with their focus on the manufacturing
industry in United States. Diaz and Cabrera (1997) saw a similar need for those in
construction to understand Climate of Safety as it related to overall worker safety in the
area of large-scale highway construction.
Further evidence of the importance of continuing to carry out this kind of research
is reflected in the work of Hinze, Hallowell, and Baud (2013), who all agreed that
“accidents and injuries still occur repeatedly on sites and it appears construction safety
has hit a plateau” (p 139). A new way of approaching safety management was emerging,
one that addressed the multi-faceted aspects of the construction job site as the complexity
of accident causation. Although accident statistics were widely used throughout the
construction industry, Laitinen, Marjamäki, and Keijo (1993) state that it is almost
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impossible to use accidents as a safety indicator for a single building construction site:
“This is because of random variation where many sites will have no accidents, and it is
not possible to determine whether these sites with zero accidents were safer than sites
with accidents ” (pp. 463-464).
To that end, Glendon and McKenna (1995) identified a number of reasons why
accident data, or similar outcome data, were poor measures of safety performance. The
main problems were that such data were insufficiently sensitive, of dubious accuracy,
retrospective, and ignored risk exposure. Therefore, it makes sense that, as a result of the
complexity of construction safety management and the inclusion of multiple trades and
multi-organizational collaboration in the construction industry, barriers still exist
systemically that impede the creation of an effective means of understanding the impact
of management styles at the macro and micro levels (Lunt, Bates, Bennett, and
Hopkinson, 2008).
Given the complexity of safety related issues in the construction industry and the
multitude of moving parts and stakeholders associated with any single project,
researchers such as Mitropoulos (2002), Abdelhamid, and Howell (2005) have suggested
that a systems approach is an effective and efficient course of action when addressing
improvements to the management of safety within the construction industry.
Consequently, since the construction industry is set apart from most other
industries in respect to site-specific safety, research and interventions make it necessary
to examine it as such. There must also be sensitivity to issues of leadership styles at the
macro-level (culture of safety), and the impact at the mezzo and micro level(s) (climate
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of safety) as a means of engendering a greater priority in all safety related construction
research and interventions of keeping the worker safe (Rowlinson, 2004).
The Impact of Leadership Styles on Climate of Safety
This review of pertinent literature and the ensuing research specifically seeks to
examine the impact that management’s leadership styles has on climate of safety at the
construction job site, paying close attention to the need to focus on the macro-level
systems and the impact they have on micro-level outcomes. Macro-level systems research
models have played a role in the creation and implementation of constructs of accident
prevention for more than two decades, with one of the most widely accepted being that of
the Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) developed by Reason (1997).
The Swiss Cheese Model (SCM), initially developed by James T. Reason in 1997,
still offers great insight into accident prevention and causation at the macro-level and
highlights the relationship and interaction between organizational policy at the highest
level, that of the construction industry as a whole and the ultimate safety of the front-line
worker.
As recently as 2013, research continues to be built upon the foundation of the
Swiss Cheese Model. Therefore, any discussion regarding safety measures and culture
and climate of safety cannot simply be based on retrospective data or lagging indicators
such as fatalities, lost time accident rates and incidents. Instead, research transcends these
paradigms and looks at more functional strategies that can be operationalized to assess
the degree to which organizations have the ability to properly evaluate day-to-day basis
safety means and methods. The Swiss Cheese Model does just that and works
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collaboratively to protect the health and well-being of the construction worker. Reason
(1997) offered a theory of accident causation as follows:


Accidents involving complex systems were often the result of the grouping of
multiple contributing factors.



Contributing factors can occur in a wide range of domains from unsafe acts
including organizational errors such as a lack of Culture of Safety.



As opposed to the active errors that occur at the time of an incident, many
contributing factors were in fact latent errors. These latent errors lie dormant,
waiting for an active effort to turn them into a trigger for an incident.



Human beings, lacking unlimited concentration, focus, and memory will always
be at risk as a result of operational errors; therefore, properly designed systems
must account for this limitation and be specifically designed to ultimately keep
these errors from resulting in an actual incident/accident.
Understanding that scientific research needs to be applicable, Reason (1997) took

the next step in his integrated accident causation approach, creating a highly effective
infographic/visual that has come to be known and widely accepted as The Swiss Cheese
Model.
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Figure 3. The Swiss Cheese Model Of Accident Causation
The figure above depicts accident causation against the backdrop of culture and
climate of safety, allowing for a deeper understanding and greater perspective on the root
cause of an accident. Rather than simply placing blame or pointing fingers, the Swiss
Cheese Model offers user-friendly, as well as immediately visible, possibilities for not
only why the accident occurred at the micro level, climate of safety, but more
importantly, how the accident was allowed to occur at the macro level, culture of safety.
Instead of focusing simply on the worker, the Swiss Cheese Model demands
management peel back the layers of accident causation, letting go of the historical
tendency to blame the worker, using words such as “careless”, “reckless” and “stupid”;
all of which were misleading as they cannot be measured and therefore have no place in
either a proactive or reactive investigation/exploration of any accident. The Swiss Cheese
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Model allows management the opportunity to preempt accidents, by proactively
exploring any and all organizational influences that may slip through the holes that we
have come to attribute literally to Swiss Cheese.
What makes this model and its contribution to construction safety so profound is
the understanding that an accident is highly unlikely, if not impossible, to occur without a
series of previous systemic failures, culture of safety. These failures may not be initially
obvious, but they do exist. They are often dormant, and as such, demand a commitment
on the part of management to sustain a level of vigilance that will allow the unseen, yet
hazardous, components of a weak culture of safety to be highlighted and in turn,
addressed and corrected long before an accident need occur.
This model acted as a foundation for further analysis and the development of
other models, including the Human Factors Analysis Classification Model (HFACS)
(Reason, 1997). Building on the foundation of accident causation, as seen in the Swiss
Cheese Model where accidents were understood as no single safety act or omission, Drs.
Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) furthered the work of Reason (1997) with the creation of
the HFACS construct. While HFACS uses many of the same explanations for systemic
failure and accident causation introduced by Reason, most notably those of organizational
influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts and unsafe conditions, it
does not stop there. This model also realizes that information can be further categorized.
This process allows for specific data to be extrapolated at each level by the inclusion of a
means of identifying both overt and covert failures that exist.
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To that end, systemic disconnect and ensuing failure will be realized at least once
at each distinct level compromising the entire system and leading to an unfavorable
event. Subsequently, during this process of system failure, if any one of these factors is
corrected, the adverse event will be prevented. In its simplest terms, the HFACS
contextual structure has the ability to offer safety professionals and researchers a reliable
and replicable way to scientifically identify weak links in an organization’s system of
safety policies and protocols that engendered a specific accident. Blame becomes
unimportant, as the focus of HFACS is not on individual fault, rather it is a measurement
instrument to better recognize those fundamental causal factors that were supported
systemically to allow for an accident to occur. (See Figure 4 below).

Figure 4. HFACS Model of Organizational Influences
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The real power in this model is its ability to synthesize historical accident and
safety data, and structure it against the backdrop of a scientific methodology. This is
important, as it allows for a comparison between seemingly unrelated accidents in an
effort to denote important trends in systemic failure. These trends were not only
applicable across the continuum of a single industry, but within the arena of safety
management as a whole. At the industry level, the application is no less powerful, as
conjoint trends with an organization act as important markers that highlight where the
highest levels of interventions were necessary to avoid system failure and in turn
accidents. This approach is highly proactive as it looks to the past as a means of
understanding the present, with the ability to better predict the potential for accidents and
take measures to decrease accident injury rates.
In utilizing the HFACS framework, organizations have a scientific method by
which to recognize interruptions within a system in its entirety, rather than a single
component of the system. This global perspective of accident prevention targets weak
areas with laser focus, and offers data-driven solution-focused options with the sole
purpose of avoiding blame and instead keeping the worker safe (Shappell & Wiegman,
2000; Celik & Cebi, 2009; Olsen & Shorrock, 2010). Therefore, the emphasis on
accident prevention and causation at the macro-level highlights the relationship and
interaction between organizational policy and the ultimate safety of the front-line worker.
In short, the focus of this research moves away from the individual worker and
the specific accident, and instead looks at the event systemically. This type of research
has emerged and appropriately deviates from a traditional and fixed explanation of
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accidents. It instead accepts the complexity and multi-layered reality that the system is
constantly in a state of fluctuation, and as such, research and intervention must continue
to address this dynamic state accordingly. Le Coze (2013) and Flin, Mearns, O'Connor,
and Bryden (2000) further echoed the need for exploration and implementation of an
effective leadership style as a means of creating a strong culture of safety, stating that
In recent years there has been a movement away from safety measures purely
based on retrospective data or lagging indicators such as fatalities, lost time
accident rates and incidents, toward so called leading indicators such as safety
audits or measurements of as safety climate (p. 177).
Understanding the Key Concepts
In an effort to further understand the scope of the research, this review also
endeavored to explain the key concepts that were most relevant to culture and climate of
safety. Cooper (2000) makes a compelling argument that defining what he refers to as the
product of safety culture allows for safety culture to take on both a form and function in
both an entire industry, as well as individual organizations/companies. Specifically, he
notes that, “this also could help to determine the functional strategies required to
developing this product, and it could provide an outcome measure to assess the degree to
which organizations might or might not possess a ‘good’ safety culture” (Cooper, 2000,
p. 115).
The reason for this literature review and ensuing research is due to the fact that
exploring safety in this manner has been absent from the construction industry. Dester
and Blockley (1995) agree, admitting that the construction industry is best described as

58
one with a neglected safety culture and climate, not one that is seen as a powerful
organizational systemic module with the ability to resolve conflict and disagreement; nor
can it act as an agent of change with the goal of focusing on efforts to improve the reality
that new safety measures cannot be fully realized until the safety culture is improved. To
that end, a culture of safety is best understood as consisting of shared beliefs, practices
and attitudes that exist at a workplace. Therefore, a culture of safety is the construct that
ultimately shapes management and employee behaviors (Parboteeah, & Kapp, 2008).
In contrast, a climate of safety consists of “shared employee perceptions of how
safety management is operationalized” (Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk & Smith-Crowne, 2002, p.
429). While a subpart of culture of safety, climate of safety is no less integral to the
creation, implementation, and ongoing sustainability of an effective and efficient culture
of safety. Together, both culture of safety and climate of safety can engender a safe(r)
construction workplace. But where ambiguity exists between macro and mezzo level
forces (management), worker safety is at risk, leading to unsafe acts and unsafe
conditions or a combination of both.
The Multi-Employer Worksite
Another important concept is that of the multi-employer construction worksite.
This is defined as any job site consisting of more than one employer and as such, the
Prime Contractor, General Contractor or any other employer or a mixture thereof can be
cited for a hazardous condition that violates an OSHA standard.
General contractors can be held liable for OSH Act violations even if they did not
create or expose their own employees to the hazard, relying on 29 C.F.R.
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§1910.12(a), which provides that ‘each employer shall protect the employment of
each of his employees engaged in construction work by complying with the
appropriated standards’ (Fonte & Griffin, 2012).
The multi-employer worksite holds unique challenges as the culture and climate of safety
are driven not only by the prime contract, but subcontracts as well.
Contracts and subcontracts can predict and impact safety when they include a
stipulation for review and approval of a mandatory construction management safety plan
included in the contract (Hinze, Hallowell, & Baud, 2013). Both a review of the literature
and a review of statistics published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics for a period of one decade shows that contracts and subcontracts have not
historically been used to measure safety (Guo, Yiu, & González, 2015). As such, this
research explores any statistically relevant relationship between catastrophic and severe
injuries based on leadership styles, with sensitivity to the role of contract/subcontract
compliance (Demirkesen & Arditi, 2015).
The Need for a Proactive Approach to Safety
The construction industry is in transition and there is still far less research looking
to evaluate the impact of proactive, rather than reactive, measures regarding safety
management on the construction work site. Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, and Bryden (2000)
offers insight, recognizing that “recent academic interest in the measurement of safety
climate, has resulted in a proliferation of assessment instruments typically in the form of
self-report questionnaires administered as large-scale surveys…in manufacturing and
construction” (p. 179). Yet, they also recognize that these measures were not without
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limitations, as they were usually created by a specific entity and as such, research validity
varies greatly due to inconsistencies in content, sample size, statistical analysis, and
methodologies. These were all reasons for more unified measurement scales that were
focused on measuring indicators such as management style and perceived climate of
safety of both key decision makers, as well the frontline worker as a means of
engendering a more unified analysis. To this end, Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991)
analyzed ten safety climate instruments and concluded that only two variables, that of
management commitment and worker involvement, had been adequately and reliably
replicated across similar research. Coyle, Sleeman, and Adams (1995) also found a high
level of variance in several studies all using the same Safety Climate Scale and concluded
that, “the likelihood of establishing a universal and stable set of safety climate factors
was highly doubtful” (p. 253).
The Need for More Quantitative Research
One of the most pressing questions in the study of construction safety is related to
the true impact of the qualitative exploration of safety climate and culture within a
company, as well as the degree to which this kind of research can exclusively be
considered a reliable gauge of safety performance in construction. This question was
brought to the forefront by Wamuziri (2007), who believed that there was a need for
research to evaluate whether it was scientifically relevant to the construction sector.
Concurrently, Guldenmund (2007) engaged in an extensive meta-analysis of
qualitative research, concluding that there were a large number of qualitative factors
(dimensions, scales, and facets) that comprise the culture and climate of safety expressed
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in weak correlations. This is in agreement with Clarke (2013), who concluded, after his
own meta-analytic review, that it is unlikely that a strong relationship can be fully
explored, relying exclusively on qualitative measures.
Choudhry, Fang, and Mohamed (2007) suggest that although development of a
positive safety culture can be an effective tool for improving safety, measurement of
safety performance remains problematic. In turn, they advocate for a multi-faceted
paradigm involving proactive approaches such as hazard identification and observation,
rooted in a quantifiable percentage of safety policies, protocols, and behaviors.
Hence, there exists a significant need in the absence of reliable research to
effectively explore and assess construction safety quantitatively and more specifically.
Also important is to explore is the impact of management’s leadership style on climate of
safety in an effort to not only understand, but to produce tangible and proactive solutions.
These solutions will decrease both fatal and nonfatal catastrophic injuries in the industry
(Shapira & Lyachin, 2009; Hapira & Simcha, 2009).
William Thomson, best known as Lord Kelvin, recognized as early as the midNineteenth Century the importance of quantitative research, stating that “if you cannot
measure it, you cannot improve it” (Cervo, Allen, & Dyché, 2011. p. 127). Later,
Hammer (1989) hypothesized that one of the greatest obstacles facing the execution of
safety management was the intrinsic challenge of the reliability of measuring it. Kartam
and Bouz (1998) voiced the same concern, focusing on the reality that if you cannot
measure safety, then you certainly cannot manage it. To that end, the researcher
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endeavored to utilize quantitative data, offering the construction industry a reliable means
by which to measure and improve culture and climate of safety.
The Application of Theory to Construction Safety
Applicable theoretical frameworks were explored to further support and gain
insight into the challenges facing workplace safety. These included Marxism and Systems
Theory, recognizing that worker health and safety have remained linked to both
economic benchmarks as well as construction safety management means and methods.
Highly structured capitalist societies such as the United States created entities that
were ostensibly meant to protect the worker. Most notably is the creation,
implementation, and sustainability of OSHA; yet Elling (1989) captures the dichotomy of
this endeavor explaining that, at the intermediate level, the agents of expropriation
function in favor of the capitalist class in an effort to alienate the working and peasant
classes from the surplus value which they produce (labor theory of value). These include:
the multinational and other concentrations of capital in competition for the highest rate of
profit; nation states and their state powers (legal, military, clandestine force, and work
inspectorates such as OSHA – the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the
U.S.A.) which attempt to assure favorable conditions for what Marx termed general
capital (not necessarily any particular firm, but capital in general); and a dynamic cultural
hegemony which, if successful, encourages workers and peasants to cooperate in their
own exploitation (p.1173).
To that end, it is necessary to explore the connection between construction
workplace safety and Marxist ideology. As a philosophical, socio-economic, and political
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paradigm, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels saw the latter portion of the Nineteenth
Century as a time not only wrought with social discontent, but also an opportunity to
explore conflict and violence. This was an attempt to formulate a theoretical construct
promulgated on the scientific pragmatism and rooted in the idea that imbalances in power
and control between different classes will lead to conflict between those who were
dominated and the parties and forces that keep them from realizing freedom and equality.
Marx and Engels looked to analyze and understand the experience of the
subjugated working class and the opportunity for self-emancipation. Communism, the
phenomenon of class struggle, and more specifically, the movement away from the
obstacles created by opposing interests and towards that of public ownership, offers
further support for the present interplay and interdependence between upper and middle
management among the construction workforce that emerges as conflict when accidents
occur.
The belief that history could be analyzed scientifically was also of great
importance to Marx’s ideologies. They were recognized in his theory of Historical
Materialism or the Materialist Conception of History. This theory was based on the
model of Dialectical Materialism, an amalgamation of Hegel’s theory of Dialectics,
giving substance to history rather than keeping it in the realm of idealism or spirituality.
This concept gives further credence to proposed research within the field of construction
safety management, as it is important to move from an idealistic approach to work safety
to that of a concrete and action-oriented plan that clearly outlines policies and procedures,
reflecting a top-down, bottom-up information loop.
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Equally relevant is Marxism’s acknowledgement of both a cultural and
institutionalized superstructure that supports the transition from one stage of sociopolitical and ultimately economic transformation to another. This would take place when
discontent is replaced by upheaval and violence and as the dominant class is displaced by
the development, implementation, and acceptance of new modes of thought and actions
by a new emerging class based on newly established political ideologies (Burns, 2002).
This focus on capital at the expense of safety is particularly relevant to a
discussion of worker safety in the construction industry as there exists a history of
placing production over safety. According to Marxist theory, safety is a commodity and
has worth. The theory further explains that private industry can choose to disregard
human capital, that of the worker, by not making safety a priority. This choice is often
driven by a desire to avoid expenditures specifically focused on worker safety as a means
of insulating profits. These decisions are reflected in leadership styles and perception of
leadership styles, as well as climate of safety, the climate with the potential to become
observable and in turn measurable in the form of unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a
combination of both.
This sentiment of profits over people is supported by management, playing off
gender roles, machismo, ethnicity, and a systemic hierarchy of power, and leadership that
encourages the worker without proper access to information regarding safety. This leaves
them with a false sense of security. In turn, Marx’s elite class would include the General
Contractors, Site Safety Managers, Foremen and anyone directly charged with worker
safety; they would also oversee protecting the capitol. This capitol can manifest as
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information, education, and traditional profits. There is a misguided belief that it is more
cost-effective to address safety based on perceived worker carelessness, risk takers, or
accident-prone laborers rather than supporting the systemic nature of construction safety
management (Elling, 1989).
This revenue-centric focus, rooted in traditional Marxist Theory, is still pervasive
today, as construction contracts reward early completion of tasks and often impose high
monetary sanctions on not meeting project deadlines. As a result, safety is greatly
undermined to protect profits.
Beyond Traditional Marxism
If the relevance of Marxism in a discussion of Construction Safety Management is
to be explored, specifically the impact of Marxist constructs on the front-line worker, it is
also important to highlight the reality that options do exist. While Marxism is rooted in
the belief that worker exploitation leads to conflict between worker and manager, it does
not fully take into account the potential for worker cooperatives, which would allow for
labor to have a vested interest in the well-being of the company. This top-down bottomup approach is especially relevant to any discussion of worker safety.
While it might be argued that the idea of worker cooperatives is outside the scope
of this research, it is believed to be pertinent as it offers a lens through which to not only
better understand Marxism, but also the potential for opportunities that support Marx’s
belief that industry should be publicly held. It was also felt that industry should protect
human capital while allowing for the continued development of the necessary economic
health of a company. This protection was particularly important in construction, where
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profit can be driven by unpredictable economic margins and indicators that were dictated
by unforeseen forces such as weather, availability of a skilled workforce, and fluctuating
indirect and direct costs of building materials.
Although the integral synergy still exists, the capital-labor paradigm becomes
more complex when seen through a worker cooperative capitalistic/Marxist lens. Yet the
basic components deemed integral by Marx remain the same, as “workers sell their labor
power to capital which appropriates the surplus values through the activities of
management” (Egan, 1990, p.71).
Also of importance is an understanding of the concepts of Formal Subordination
and Real Subordination as it relates to Marxism. Since neo-classical views on the labor
force support the concept that labor is a commodity, the inherent implication is that the
relationship between management and the worker must be comprised of purely opposing
goals and objectives. Therefore, the theoretical construct that the workforce is disposable
and can be reestablished for each new project must be recognized (Gintis, 1976, p. 44).
This belief for the need for an adversarial relationship between workers and management,
although flawed, is in concert with similar beliefs in the construction industry. More
appropriate is a recognition that the construction worker, Marx’s labor, is multi-faceted,
not only representing the individual worker, but the power of that individual’s work
including his or her ability to work and collaborate with others to increase productivity.
This reality must be recognized for its multiplicities as it supports the marketplace but is
consumed and controlled both within and separate from the market/workplace (Marx,
1930, Chap. 6 Vol. 1; Gintis, 1976, pp. 36 -37).
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Therefore, the Marxist paradigm is an appropriate means of expressing not only
the potential of an employer’s control over the worker, but specifically in the construction
industry, the modalities asserted by Marx regarding domination of the organization and
subordination of the worker can be used as an expression of the potential for effective
Construction Safety Management and a strong culture and climate of safety. The
construction worksite, with the General Contractor in the seat of power, dictates that
which governs both the labor force and the labor process (Stark 1978; Bowles & Ginitis
1976, p. 42). This need not be a purely dichotomous construct, as management and
workers can and should work together to keep the construction worksite as safe as
possible, given the realities of such a hazardous industry.
To that end, a more traditional Marxist view is most appropriate when exploring
the role of management and its impact on worker safety in the construction industry.
Beyond the power of the purse, Marxism is as much about a much larger continuum of
power and control as it is with control that management can execute and delegate work
tasks that supersede organizational culture, including policies, procedures, manifestos,
and even OSHA standards, and still justify and protect capital.
This concept can be further expanded upon to include access to information and
education, as both are resources; as such, by withholding training and information under
the auspices of a worker’s “Right to Know”, akin to the capitalist principles of “trade
secrets”, the worker is placed secondary to profits (Epstein, 1979). This philosophy of
construction safety management simply does not work, and when explained through the
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lens of Marxist Theory, is neither an effective nor efficient means of keeping the worker
safe.
Systems Theory
Systems Theory is also applicable to this research. It is based on the premise that
information is to be understood in the context of the totality of all the parts and not a
process of segmentation. This is especially relevant today with the whole vs. the parts
challenge that manifested during the last century into so-called systems theory
(Bogdanov, 1922; von Bertalanffy, 1968; Laszlo, 1996; Meadows, 2008).
Interdisciplinary in its construct, systems theory is highly adaptable as it can be applied
not only to systemic occurrences found in nature, but can also be used to explain
challenges that arise in various other spheres including those frameworks that comprise
the psychological as well as socio-economic continuum of the workplace.
At its core, a systems approach is built upon the belief that the focus must move
from the part of the whole towards a unified and interactive understanding of phenomena,
where the individual components are obscured by the more important correlation between
them (Checkland, 1997; Weinberg, 2001; Jackson, 2001; Luhmann, 1990).
The systemic framework, when understood as a unit that can be observed and
therefore measured (Ng, Maull, and Yip, 2009), is an especially relevant aspect of the
proposed research as it explores interactions and relationships between the parts of the
entire system with a realization that the construction industry, as well as the individual
job site, must be seen as components of both the conflict and the solution. As such, this
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allows for the understanding of how the system, the construction industry, as well as the
construction job site, is ordered, allowing for the ability to quantify safety outcomes.
While the central concept of the theory is one which is focused on exchanges,
these interactions must be further understood and categorized as open, closed, and
isolated in their nature (Mele, Pels, & Polese, 2010). In an open system, the exchange of
information energy and/or human capital exists as a result of the ability to interact and
therefore be impacted externally by the environment. In a closed system, the exchange
differs insofar as information remains within the system, whereas an insulated system is
so far removed and inaccessible that energy has no opportunity to make contact or
interact with any other forces reflecting 100% autonomy (Boulding, 1956; Katz & Kahn,
1978). The construction job site is a continuum, and as such must be seen as passing
through all three stages. Yet when it becomes closed or isolated for too long
communication breaks down and worker safety is at risk (Checkland, 1997).
To that end, these theories, in combination with the existing literature and
critiques of said literature, act as both the foundation and explanation for construction
safety. This is all done from a culture and conflict evaluation, offering the opportunity for
exploration, in addition to an intact, yet limited body of research regarding the
construction industry, which is an industry in transition and in conflict with itself.
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Chapter 4: Methods
Research Method
The research method that was used was a quantitative approach comparing
management leadership styles on climate of safety. The reason these variables were
chosen was to reflect macro-level decisions (leadership styles) as well as micro-level
outcomes (climate of safety) on the parts of key stakeholders as well as the worker who is
involved in the actual tasks and as such, is most directly impacted by any unsafe acts,
unsafe conditions, or a combination of both.
Data was collected using an anonymous electronic survey sent out by the National
Demolition Association (NDA) as well as Construction Today Magazine in an effort to
capture the greatest sample size of both management and the front-line worker. Two
surveys were chosen. The first was that of the Leadership Questionnaire as created by
Zohar (1980) because of its ability to measure both real and perceived levels of
organizational safety on the part of management as well as workers, focusing on the
importance of safety held by each group.
The second survey was chosen to measure preferred leadership styles by
construction safety management professionals and integrate these choices with the
perception of management’s leadership style by the worker. First created and
implemented by Jung, Jeong, and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and
multifaceted character of the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration
of a relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when utilized, as
well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and real perception of
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leadership expectations of both the manager and the frontline worker, collectively giving
greater insight into the top-down, bottom-up approach to construction safety
management.
Respondents were able to log in anonymously via the link to the online server and
complete the survey. The survey was the same for all respondents and should have taken
approximately 15-20 minutes to complete.
The two surveys utilized by the researcher have been adapted only to reflect
proper noun-verb agreement. They remained exactly the same in both form and content
and the changes were merely to adhere to standard and accepted grammar. Specifically,
this is reflected in the appropriate use of pronouns for the Manager and Worker Surveys
where the manager was asked '' I " statements and where necessary and when evaluating
his or her manager, the worker was asked about the manager in "he/she" and "his/her"
statements that do not deviate from the content of the question. These are noted and
reflected in the attached surveys in both the instructions as well as the body of the
research tool.
Both the NDA and Construction Today Magazine received a template letter/flyer
to send out to their general membership as well as links to the survey that can be
distributed. These organizations were asked to send out the survey in the form of webbased mail to their opt-in members, as well as via their opt-in online newsletter to
subscribers, all of whom hold managerial or worker status in the construction industry.
The NDA is member driven and includes a membership fee; Construction Today
is subscription based. This is important as it shows interest and motivation on the part of
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those who join to utilize important industry information offered as well as share their own
insights and feedback regularly via similar requests to complete surveys by both
organizations throughout the year. Since safety has been identified as an important topic
by both organizations, and due to the concise and user-friendly nature of the surveys, the
researcher expected completion of the surveys within a timely manner.
In each case, when the survey was sent out, the individual link for management
vs. workers was clearly indicated so that the proper group utilized the appropriate link.
Respondents were then able to click the link anonymously via the link to the online sever
and complete the survey. Adhering to good and accepted research guidelines and
practices, no protected health information (PHI) was included in any of the surveys, so a
Web Link Collector (WLC) was utilized in an effort to capture a larger audience by
giving respondents the ability to forward the survey via a unique link to any individual(s)
they believed fit the requirement. Furthermore, for added protection SSL encryption was
utilized, as it improved security by encrypting surveys and survey results.
As noted, a (WLC) was included in the electronic survey. When the respondent
forwarded the link, the recipient only received a blank copy of the survey and did not
have access to the sender’s answers. This helped to ensure that when forwarded, the
recipient was not intentionally or unintentionally influenced by the sender's responses.
Research Questions
Research Question One (RQ1): Is there a relationship between management’s
leadership style and climate of safety?
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Null hypothesis (Ho1): There is no relationship between participatory leadership
style and the climate of safety.



Alternate hypothesis (H1): Managers who adopt a more inclusive and
participatory leadership styles are more likely to rank higher on the climate of
safety.



Null hypothesis (Ho2): There is no relationship between autocratic leadership
style and the climate of safety.



Alternate hypothesis (H2): Managers who adopt a more autocratic leadership
styles were less likely to rank higher on the climate of safety.



Null hypothesis (Ho3): There is no relationship between free rein leadership style
and the climate of safety.



Alternate hypothesis (H2): Compared to their counterparts, managers who adopt
more free rein leadership styles were neither less likely nor more likely to
prioritize the climate of safety.
Research Question Two (RQ2): Is there a relationship between worker’s

perception of leadership style and the climate of safety?


Null hypothesis (Ho4): There is no relationship between worker’s perception of
participatory leadership style and their perception regarding the climate of safety.



Alternate hypothesis (H4): Workers who perceive their managers as participatory
are more likely to prioritize the climate of safety.



Null hypothesis (Ho5): There is no relationship between worker’s perception of
autocratic leadership style and their perception regarding the climate of safety.
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Alternate hypothesis (H5): Workers who perceive managers as autocratic are less
likely to perceive their safety as being a workplace priority.



Null hypothesis (Ho6): There is no relationship between worker’s perception of
free rein leadership style and their perception regarding the climate of safety.



Alternate hypothesis (H6): Workers who perceive managers to free rein are less
likely to perceive their safety as being a workplace priority.
Research Question 3 (RQ2): Is there a relationship between the size of the

workforce, the manager’s leadership style, and their perception regarding the climate of
safety?


Null hypothesis (Ho7): There is no relationship between the size of the
workforce, the manager’s leadership style, and their perception regarding the
climate of safety.



Alternate hypothesis (H7): Leaders who manage a small team and who ascribe to
a participatory style of leadership are more likely to score high regarding the
climate of safety when compared to autocratic leaders with a large sized
workforce.

Surveys
The first two versions of the survey for this study, one created for management
and one for the worker, are constructed in three parts. Part One was created by the
researcher and is comprised of 11 questions used to capture necessary demographical
information. The categories utilized are consistent with those used by the Bureau of
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Labor Statistics for collecting similar data across all industries in the United States. Part
Two consists of 13 questions asking for the manager to rate his or her leadership style.
The same questions, with changes made only to noun-verb agreement, are also
used with respondents in the worker category, asking them to rate the leadership style of
the highest-level manager with whom they have contact with at least once a week. The
questions for both groups involve leadership styles described by three styles: 1)
Autocratic, 2) Participatory, and 3) Free Rein as these are consistent with the research
methodology found to be most effective by the creators (Jung, Jeong, & Mills, 2014) and
equally applicable by the researcher for this study. Part Three asks respondents in both
samples to circle or check the answer that most represents how strongly they feel about a
specific statement. Again, only the noun-verb agreement has been adjusted to apply to
management and the worker, having no bearing on the content of the question.
The techniques utilized by all forms of this survey are conveyed by answers in the
form of fill-in-the-blank or Likert-type scales. Since Part One endeavors to capture
necessary demographical information, it also implements, to a very limited degree, the
use of open-ended/fill-in-the-blank questions in which the participants were be expected
to type a response:
1. What is your highest educational level?
a. Rationale: This is the first out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Answers include: Did Not Complete High School, High School/GED, Some
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College, Bachelor’s Degree, Master’s Degree, Advanced Graduate Work, or
PhD.
2. What is your degree? (Check all that apply)
a. Rationale: This is the second out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Answers include: Other, Engineering, Construction, Architecture,
Construction Safety Management, and None of the Above.
3. What is your current Union Affiliation?
a. Rationale: This is the third out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Answers include: Yes or No.
4. How many years have you worked in the construction industry?
a. Rationale: This is the fourth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Participant enters the answer manually.
5. How many years have you worked in your present trade?
a. Rationale: This is the fifth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
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States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Participants enters the answers manually.
6. Have you ever taken a leadership program?
a. Rationale: This is the sixth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Answers include: Yes or No.
7. What is your Age?
a. Rationale: This is the seventh out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Participants input the answers.
8. What is your Race?
a. Rationale: This is the eighth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Answers include: White/Caucasian, Hispanic or Latino, Other, Asian,
American Indian or Alaskan, and Black or African American.
9. What is your Gender?
a. Rationale: This is the ninth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
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States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Answers include: Male or Female.
10. What Region of the country do you work in most often?
a. Rationale: This is the tenth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Respondent enters the figures manually.
11. What size company do you work for most often?
a. Rationale: This is the eleventh out of eleven questions chosen for this survey
to capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data.
Respondent enters the figures manually.
12. Leadership style can be described into three styles: 1) Autocratic, 2) Participatory,
and 3) Free Rein. When answering the questions below please rate YOUR
PERSONAL leadership style. For the worker, it read: Leadership style can be
described by three styles: 1) Autocratic, 2) Participatory, and 3) Free Rein. When
answering the questions below please rate the leadership style of the highest-level
Supervisor you have contact with at least once a week. Based on leadership styles
above, please check, from your perspective, the appropriate leadership style in
decision-making for position worked below.
a. Rationale: This question was chosen to measure preferred leadership styles by
construction safety management professionals and integrate these choices with
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the perception of management’s leadership style by the worker. First created
and implemented by Jung, Jeong and Mills (2014), it reflects the
interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of the construction jobsite and as
such, allows for an exploration of the relationship between leadership
preference on the overall efficacy when utilized, as well as offering a better
understanding regarding the perceived and real perception of leadership
expectations of both the manager and the frontline worker collectively. This
portion of the survey used a multiple-choice format. The answers were
responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Always, and Often.
13. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Make sure the majority rules.
a. Rationale: This question was chosen to measure preferred leadership styles by
construction safety management professionals and integrate these choices with
the perception of management’s leadership style by the worker. First created
and implemented by Jung, Jeong and Mills (2014), it reflects the
interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of the construction jobsite and as
such, allows for an exploration of the relationship between leadership
preference on the overall efficacy when utilized, as well as offering a better
understanding regarding the perceived and real perception of leadership
expectations of both the manager and the frontline worker collectively. This
portion of the survey uses a Likert-type scale. The answers were responded to
as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Always, and Often.

80
14. When making decision in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Persuade others to do things my way.
a. Rationale: This question is the second of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong,
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
15. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Tell others what to do.
a. Rationale: This question is the third of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
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relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
16. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Turn decision over to others.
a. Rationale: This question is the fourth of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
17. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Share my own ideas.
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a. Rationale: This question is the fifth of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
18. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Suggest a decision to others.
a. Rationale: his question is the sixth of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
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real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
19. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Rely on my own judgment.
a. Rationale: This question is the seventh of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
20. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Participate just like any other person.
a. Rationale: This question is the eighth of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
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professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
21. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Make my own decision.
a. Rationale: This question is the ninth of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
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scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
22. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Provide resources to others.
a. Rationale: This question is the tenth of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offers a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
23. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Ask others to brainstorm choices.
a. Rationale: This question is the eleventh of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
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and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
24. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Gather others’ feedback before deciding.
a. Rationale: This question is the twelfth of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
and Mills (2014) it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
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25. When making decision in a team-working environment, I act in the following
ways: Refer to contracts for direction.
a. Rationale: This question is the twelfth of twelve questions and was chosen to
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong
and Mills (2014) it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes,
Always, and Often.
26. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to-day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: React quickly to solve the problem
when told about safety hazards.
a. Rationale: This is the first question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
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The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
27. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Insist on thorough and regular safety
audits and inspections.
a. Rationale: This is the second question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
28. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Try to continually improve safety
levels in each department.
a. Rationale: This is the third question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
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29. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Provide all the equipment needed to
do the job safely.
a. Rationale: This is the fourth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
30. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to-day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Strict about working safely when
work falls behind schedule.
a. Rationale: This is the fifth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
31. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
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priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Quickly correct any safety hazard
(even if it’s costly).
a. Rationale: This is the sixth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
32. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Provide detailed safety reports to
workers (e.g., injuries, near accidents).
a. Rationale: This is the seventh question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
33. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Considers a worker’s safety
behavior when moving–promoting people.
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a. Rationale: This is the eighth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
34. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Require each manager to help
improve safety in his/her department.
a. Rationale: This is the ninth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
35. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Invest a lot of time and money in
safety training for workers.
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a. Rationale: This is the tenth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980) because of its ability to measure both real and
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
36. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Use any available information to
improve existing safety rules.
a. Rationale: This is the eleventh question out of sixteen questions chosen for
this survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real
and perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as
well as workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each
group. The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low
Priority, Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
37. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Listen carefully to workers’ ideas
about improving safety.
a.

Rationale: This is the twelfth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and
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perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as
workers; thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group.
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority,
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
38. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Consider safety when setting
production speed and schedules.
a. Rationale: This is the thirteenth question out of sixteen questions chosen for
this survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real
and perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as
well as workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each
group. The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low
Priority, Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
39. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to-day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Provide workers with a lot of
information on safety issues.
a. Rationale: This is the fourteenth question out of sixteen questions chosen for
this survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real
and perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as
well as workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each
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group. The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low
Priority, Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
40. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to-day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Regularly holds safety-awareness
events (e.g., presentations, ceremonies).
a. Rationale: This is the fifteenth question out of sixteen questions chosen for
this survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real
and perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as
well as workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each
group. The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low
Priority, Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
41. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies,
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Give safety personnel the power
they need to do their job.
a. Rationale: This is the sixteenth question out of sixteen questions chosen for
this survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real
and perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as
well as workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each
group. The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low
Priority, Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.
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Participants
The sample population for this research included data for individuals in the
private construction industry of all sizes across the entire United States. While the data
may not be reflective of all fifty states, the sample of between 75 and 150 respondents
reflects the Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western regions of the country, including
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. This sample population was comprised of
adults 18 years of age or older, and as well as the following socio-economic statuses:
Education, employment, inclusion in a leadership program of any kind, age, race, gender,
and region of the country where they work in the construction industry most frequently.
The aim of utilizing this group was to have the ability to effectively generalize results
from the sample to better apply the results to the general construction industry (Babbie,
1990; Creswell, 2009).
Materials
Two instruments were utilized for this research. These research instruments
captured data of the sample populations in the form of an online survey. The survey was
in English only, and asked respondents to answer questions that were nearly identical,
albeit with changes in noun-verb agreement to make the questions understandable and
grammatically correct when applied to a sample of management vs. construction workers.
To that end, only those respondents who were literate in English and had access to
Internet and computers, tablets, or smart phones could participate and be included in this
study.
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Each survey consisted of a part one created by the researcher, and comprised 11
questions that collected demographic information consistent with the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. The first survey
was chosen to measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management
professionals and workers and integrated these choices with the perception of
management’s leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung,
Jeong and Mills (2014), it reflected the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of the
construction jobsite. It allowed for an exploration of the relationship between leadership
preference on the overall efficacy when utilized, as well as offering a better
understanding regarding the perceived and real perception of leadership expectations of
both the manager and the frontline worker. Collectively, greater insight into the topdown, bottom-up approach to construction safety management was provided.
The second survey, created by Zohar (1980), was chosen because of its ability to
measure both real and perceived levels of organizational safety, on the part of
management as well as workers. It focused on the importance of safety held by each
group.
Design and Procedure
This research utilized a quantitative methodology. The focus of the study was to
examine the correlation between management’s leadership styles and the impact on
climate of safety, as this has the most far-reaching influence on worker safety. This was
accomplished by examining macro, mezzo and micro-level constructs of leadership styles
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as well as perceived climate of safety as a means of measuring from a top-down and
bottom-up approach.
The researcher endeavored to study and create a reliable measurement tool to
gauge the level of construction safety on the jobsite. This was accomplished by moving
beyond the traditional lagging indicators, which support reactive safety policy and
protocols, and focusing on leadership styles of those charged with keeping the worker
safe. Additionally, this study was concerned with a more comprehensive understanding
regarding the perceived leadership style by the worker, focusing on whom he or she
identifies to be in charge of their day-to-day safety, leading to a deeper understanding of
each group’s perception of safety climate at their construction jobsite.
The quantitative analysis regarding accident causation, or more specifically, the
means and methods by which it is prioritized and operationalized, allowed for new
insights into the way in which macro, mezzo, and micro-level entities in the construction
industry integrate both individual and group epistemological assumptions of leadership,
leadership styles, safety and ultimately safety climate in an effort to keep the construction
job site free of unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of both.
Research Design
The intention of the surveys was to collectively gain greater insight into the
macro-level issues related to construction safety management, how management
perceives their role, and to further define the impact these forces have on the frontline
worker.
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Each survey had 11 demographic variables as a means of classifying respondents
into various groupings. This delineation also helped to recognize if there were any
unexpected or unforeseen statistical correlations among the variables, which included
level of education, degree, union affiliation, years in the industry, years worked in present
trade, inclusion in a leadership training course, age, race, gender, and region of the
country worked.
The study further investigated the impact of particular variables and the resulting
impact these variables had on the ability to manage effectively in an extremely hazardous
industry such as construction. Systemically, it also allowed for the ability to gauge any
differences in the perception of the macro and micro level entities of management and
worker, regarding perceptions of leadership style and climate of safety. Subsequently,
this research was also a barometer for safety mindfulness and responsiveness.
Leadership styles and perceived climate of safety were measured as a means of
investigating the potential quantitative correlation between a specific leadership style and
climate of safety on the construction jobsite. While concrete leadership styles were
scientifically evaluated, equally important was the measurement of both management’s
and workers’ perception of safety, which reflects the systemic nature of the industry and
the inherent potential, when strong, to keep the worker safe, and when undermined, put
him or her at greater risk of injury.
Strategy and Measurement
The analysis was conducted with SPSS, which calculated statistical data. Equally
important, it allowed for the analysis of inferential statistics (cross tabulation and
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correlation). The researcher also explored any statistically relevant outcomes based on the
demographic information acquired. This provided a means of verifying if this information
had any bearing on leadership styles and perceived climate of safety.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was utilized to further determine and measure
the influence of leadership style as described by management, leadership of management
as seen by the worker, and perceived climate of safety as described by both groups
respectively.
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Chapter 5: Results
This research utilized quantitative methods by means of a twenty-eight-question
survey. This tool gathered general demographic information as well as more specific
characteristics from respondents, including the perception of the general importance of
the construction contract, specific perception of the importance the construction contract
gives regarding safety, level of education, any specific degrees held, union affiliation
(e.g. union versus non-union), overall years worked in the construction industry, number
of years working in present trade, involvement in any leadership program(s), the state in
which he/she presently works, size of company (number of employees), years worked in
the construction industry and years worked in present trade.
Perception of leadership style on the part of both workers and managers was
measured by utilizing a fourteen-question quiz, the Survey of Construction Managerial
Leadership Styles, designed by Younghan Jung and Thomas H. Mills (2014) and an
adapted sixteen-question Safety Climate Scale originally designed by Dov Zohar (1980)
to measure perception of climate of safety.
Descriptive Statistics
Current U.S. State of Residence. The goal of all instruments was to acquire a
sample of 150 total respondents equal to, or greater than, 75 managers and 75 workers, all
of whom would reflect anonymous participants from the fifty United States, including
Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico, with a minimum requirement of 150 total respondents
for statistical significance. The survey was launched online, utilizing the help of the
National Demolition Association (NDA) and Construction Today Magazine (CTM) to
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gain further amplification and access by the industry. Respondents were further urged to
share the survey link with professional peers appropriate for this study via email and
social media platforms. A total of 530 participants took the survey, 314 managers and
203 workers completed it in its entirety totaling 513, with 17 incompletes. This tool
demonstrates geographical representation with the sample reflecting states 48 of the 50
contiguous states, excluding responses from Montana and New Mexico, as well as
Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico. The state with the highest number of respondents
was California (62), followed by Florida (36) and Texas (32). The other states
represented a range of 1 to 28 regarding participation: Alabama (11), Alaska (1), Arizona
(11), Arkansas (4), Colorado (11), Connecticut (5), Delaware (2), Georgia (22), Hawaii
(3), Idaho (4), Illinois (19), Indiana (10), Iowa (6), Kansas (5), Kentucky (10), Louisiana
(9), Maine (3), Maryland (4), Massachusetts (15), Michigan (18), Minnesota (12),
Mississippi (4), Missouri (8), Nebraska (3), Nevada (3), New Hampshire (1), New Jersey
(11), New York (28), North Carolina (18), Ohio (18), Oklahoma (2), Oregon (8),
Pennsylvania (20), Rhode Island (5), South Carolina (4), South Dakota (2), Tennessee
(9), Utah (6), Vermont (1), Virginia (7), Washington (9), West Virginia (1), Wisconsin
(9), Wyoming (1). (See Figure 5 below).
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Figure 5.U.S. state of residence of participants.
Gender. The respondents had two choices regarding gender, Male or Female. A
total of 504 participants responded to this question, with 26 choosing not to answer; of
the 504 who did respond, 71.43 percent identified as male with the remaining 28.57
percent identifying as female. (See Figure 6 below).

Figure 6. Gender of participants.
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Age. The survey participants had to manually enter age, a distinction that is
noteworthy when compared with the use of a range, often associated with other
instruments. A total of 511 participants responded with 19 choosing to decline to answer.
The associated histogram reflects the mean age of respondents as (M=36.51) with a
standard deviation of 10.30. (See Figure 7 below).

Figure 7. Distribution of participants’ ages.
Race. The diversity of race and/or ethnicity in the construction industry has
historically been reflected in its work force and on the jobsite. Subsequently, this survey
endeavored to mirror this multiplicity, understanding that individual workers and
managers may identify themselves utilizing more traditional categories, while others may
feel more comfortable with self-created or emerging classifications. For this reason, this
question was created to have both fixed responses including a choice for “other” as a
means of capturing a response rather than risking losing the participant’s response. The
selections included: White/Caucasian, Hispanic or Latino, Asian, American Indian or
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Alaska Native, Black or African American and Other. There were 504 respondents who
answered with 26 choosing to not to respond. Those who responded reflected the
following results, with 69.8 percent identifying as White/Caucasian, 10.8 percent
Hispanic or Latino, 2.5 percent as Asian, .80 percent American Indian or Alaska Native
8.3 percent Black or African American and 3.0 percent as “Other.” (See Figure 8 below).

Figure 8. Distribution of participants’ race/ethnicity
Years working in the construction industry. In a continued effort to collect the
most comprehensive data to best understand the sample, respondents were asked how
long they had worked cumulatively in the construction industry. The question was openended, allowing the respondents to manually enter a numerical value. The associated
histogram reflects the mean age of respondents as (M=11.59) with a standard deviation of
8.24. There were 511 respondents who answered this question and 19 who chose not to
respond. The greatest number of years in the industry was (10) at 10.2 percent followed
by (15) at 9.8 percent and (20) at 8.8 percent with the other. (See Figure 9 below).
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Figure 9. Years working in the construction industry.
Years working in present trade. Recognizing that as in any industry workers
often have a multiplicity of skills, this question asked respondents to focus on the
area/trade in which they were working in the construction industry at the time they took
the survey. The associated histogram reflects a mean age of respondents as (M=10.15)
with a standard deviation of 7.80. There were 506 respondents who answered the
question and 24 who chose not to answer. The question was open-ended, allowing the
respondents to manually enter a numerical value. The greatest number of years working
in their present trade was (11) at 11.3 percent followed by (5) at 9.1 percent and (15) at
7.5 percent. (See Figure 10 below).
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Figure 10. Years working in present trade.
Education level. In this portion, the survey respondents were asked to designate
their highest level of completed education. The question was constructed offering the
following selections: Did not complete High School, High School/GED, Some college,
Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, Advanced graduate work or PhD. There were 511
respondents with 19 choosing not to answer. Those who responded reflected the
following results: 2.136 percent of the participants did not complete High School, 26.99
percent indicated completing High School or obtaining a GED, 34.37 percent had some
college, 24.08 percent a Bachelor’s degree, 10.1 percent a Master’s degree and 2.33
percent had been involved in Advanced graduate work or held a PhD. (See Figure 11
below).
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Figure 11. Education level
Type of college degrees. Understanding that the construction industry is
comprised of a multi-faceted work force, which is further reflected in an interdisciplinary
cross-section of college degrees on the part workers and managers, this question aimed to
gather greater specificity from those with college degrees. Therefore, it was constructed
to provide both fixed and open-ended responses and allowed for multiple categories to be
checked, including the option to manually add a specialized degree in the box marked
“Other”. The selections were: Engineering, Construction, Architecture, Construction
Safety Management, None of the above and “Other”. There were 510 respondents with
20 choosing not to respond. Of those who responded, the results were: 14.31 percent
reported having an Engineering degree, 31.76 percent a Construction degree, 3.53 percent
a degree in Architecture, 9.02 percent Construction Safety Management, 31.76 None of
the above, and 9.61 percent “Other”. Those choosing the “Other” option responded with
the following: Accounting, Automotive, Aviation, Bachelor of Arts, Business
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Management, Business, Certificated, Computer Drafting, Communications, Cook,
Counter-Terrorism, CPA, Education, Elementary Education, Finance, General Contractor
licensed by state, Heavy Equipment Operator, High School GED, Healthcare, HVAC,
Human Biology, Industrial Design, IT Technology, Janitor, Management Medical
Assistant, No, Nursing, Other, Occupational Safety and Health, Ok, On Job certification
training, Paralegal Technology and Business Management, Private Investigator and
Science. (See Figure 12 below).

Figure 12. Specialized college degree.
Union Affiliation. The construction industry is comprised of both Union and
Non-Union workers. As a result, it was important to include this question regarding union
status as a means of capturing the most well-rounded profile of those who responded. The
selections included: Union and Non-Union. There were 511 respondents and 19
choosing not to respond. Those who responded reflected the following results: 30.53
percent identified as Union workers and 69.47 percent as Non-Union workers. (See
Figure 13 below).
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Figure 13. Union affiliation.
Size of Organization. Because the construction industry is comprised of various
sized companies, this question was asked to better understand the size of the organization
based on number of employees. The selections included: 1-50, 51-250, 251-500, 5011000, 1001+. There were 504 respondents who chose to answer and 26 who did not.
Those who responded reflected the following results: 47.82 percent reported working in
companies with 1-50 employees, 24.40 percent with 51-250 employees, 14.48 percent
with 251-500 employees, 6.94 percent with 501-1000 employees and 6.40 percent
reporting 1001 or more. (See Figure 14 below).
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Figure 14. Size of 0rganization
Leadership Training. While not all workers will ever realize
managerial/leadership roles, this question was utilized to better understand how familiar
the sample of respondents was with basic leadership concepts. The selections included:
yes or no. There were 513 responses with 17 individuals choosing not to respond. Those
who responded indicated that 51.66 percent answered yes and 48.34 answered no. (See
Figure 15 below).

Figure 15. Leadership program
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Leadership Style. Building on the desire for a deeper understanding of how those
taking the survey perceived either their personal leadership style or that of their
supervisor, respondents were asked to refer to an explanation of three leadership styles,
specifically that of the autocratic, participatory, or free rein leadership and associated
traits as outlined in the brief description accompanying the question. Given these
selections: autocratic, participatory, or free rein, there were 499 responses and 31
individuals who chose not to respond. The responses showed that 25.65 percent identified
with those qualities of an autocratic leader, 61.92 percent with that of a participatory
leader and 12.42 percent with that of a free rein leadership style. (See Figure 16 below).

Figure 16. Perceived leadership style.
The Construction Contract. The means and methods associated with completing
a construction project are reflected in the construction contract. To that end, the
perception of the importance of this document is also integral in understanding the
sample of respondents. This question was constructed based on the Likert model and
consisted of the following selections: Not very important, Not important, Neither,
Important, and Very important. There were 525 individuals in the sample who responded
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and 5 who did not. The responses showed that 1.33 percent deemed the construction
contract as Not very important, 1.14 percent as Not important, 2.48 percent as neither,
28.95 percent as Important and 66.10 percent as Very important. (See Figure 17 below).

Figure 17. The construction contract.
The Construction Contract and Safety. While awareness of the contract offers
insight, understanding this level of awareness, especially as it relates to safety, is yet
another means of building a comprehensive profile of those who responded to the survey.
This question regarding the importance of the construction contract regarding safety was
constructed to do just that by utilizing the same Likert scale as that used in the prior
contract question consisting of the following selections: Not very important, Not
important, neither, Important and Very important. There were 524 individuals in the
sample who responded and 6 who chose not to respond. These responses regarding the
construction contract and safety indicated that 0.76 percent deemed it Not very important,
1.15 percent Not important, 2.10 percent as neither, 19.08 percent Important and 76.91
percent as Very important. (See Figure 18 below).

113

Figure 18. The construction contract and safety.
The Construction Contract: Safety Policies and Procedures. This question was
posed in a continued effort to understand the extent to which the sample perceived the
importance of the construction contract as a safety tool. This was achieved by
constructing a yes or no question regarding awareness of the existence of safety policies,
procedures, and protocols within a standard construction contract. There were 501
respondents and 29 who chose not to respond. The responses indicated that 88.62 percent
answered yes to an awareness of such components in the standard construction contract
with 11.38 percent responding no. (See Figure 19 below).
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Figure 19. Awareness of safety policies and procedures
Perception of safety. The construction job site is not without hazards, and the
construction contract can be used to mitigate risk of unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a
combination of both. As such, perception of safety is an important factor in
understanding those who chose to take part in this survey. Subsequently, they were asked
an open-ended question allowing them to manually input a numeric value utilized to
measure the number of times in the last 30 days he or she perceived feeling unsafe (on
the part of worker) or received reports of feeling unsafe (on the part of the manager). The
associated histogram reflects a mean of (M=1.33) with a standard deviation of 3.70.
There were 492 respondents who answered the question and 38 who chose not to
respond. The greatest number regarding feeling unsafe on the jobsite was 60.2 percent
reporting they never felt unsafe followed by 10.4 percent who felt unsafe one time and
9.6 percent who felt unsafe two times, 4.3 percent felt unsafe (3) times, 1.1 percent (4)
times, 2.1 percent (5) times, 1.1 percent (6) times, .40 percent (7 ) times, .60 percent (8)
times, .90 percent (10) times, .20 percent (11) times, .60 percent (12) times, .40 percent
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(15) times, .20 percent (20) times, .20 percent (22) times, .40 percent ( 30 times) and .20
percent (45) times. (See Figure 20 below).

Figure 20. Perception of safety.
Managers, Workers, and the Climate of Safety
Managers by importance of the construction contract. A Chi-square test of
independence was calculated to determine the relationship between management status
(manager versus worker) and the importance of construction contract. Participants were
asked to rate the importance of the construction contract with answers ranging from not
very important, not important, neither, important, and very important. The relationship
between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=517) = 21.59, p<.001. (See Figure 21
below).
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Figure 21. Managers by importance of the construction contract.
Table 1
Managers by Importance of the Construction Contract
Chi-Square Tests for Manager by Importance of the Construction Contract
Value
Df Asymp. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig. (2- Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
sided)
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Pearson Chi-Square
22.107a 4
.000
.000b
.000
.000
b
Likelihood Ratio
22.075
4
.000
.000
.000
.000
Fisher's Exact Test
21.591
.000b
.000
.000
Linear-by-Linear
c
b
3.238
1
.072
.081
.074
.088
Association
N of Valid Cases
517
a. 5 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 624387341.
c. The standardized statistic is -1.800.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and the importance of the construction contract. The Cramer’s V was
.21, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. While both managers
and workers value construction contract, 72.9% of managers viewed it as very important,
compared to workers at 56.2%. Conversely, 40.4% of workers viewed the construction
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contract as important, compared to managers at 21.7%. As such, managers and workers
differed in how they view the construction contract.
Manager’s perception of the importance of the construction contract
regarding safety. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to determine the
relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and the importance of
construction contract regarding safety. Participants were asked to rate the importance of
the construction contract with answers ranging from not very important, not important,
neither, important, and very important. The relationship between these variables was
significant,  2(4, N=513) = 11.89, p=.012. (See Figure 22 below).

Figure 22. Manager’s perception of the importance of the construction contract regarding
safety
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Table 2
Chi-square test of managers by importance of construction contract regarding safety.
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.017
.019

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.013
.010
.016
.031b
.027
.036
.012b
.009
.015

Pearson Chi-Square
12.030a 4
Likelihood Ratio
11.825
4
Fisher's Exact Test
11.886
Linear-by-Linear
3.426c
1
.064
.067b
.060
.073
Association
N of Valid Cases
513
a. 5 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.58.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 957002199.
c. The standardized statistic is -1.851.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and the importance of the construction contract regarding safety. The
Cramer’s V was .15, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. As such,
managers were more likely to rate the construction contract regarding safety as very
important (81.7%), compared to workers (69.8%). Conversely, workers were more likely
to view the construction contract regarding safety as important (26.2%) when compared
to managers (14.5%). The graph on page 127 depicts this relationship.
Manger by Education. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
level of education. Participants were asked to report the highest level of education they
have completed, with answers ranging from did not complete high school, high school or
GED, some college, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and advanced graduate work or
PhD. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(5, N=503) = 38.55,
p<.001. (See Figure 23 below).
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Figure 23. Manager by education.
Table 3
Manager by Education
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.000
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square 37.829a 5
Likelihood Ratio
40.021 5
Fisher's Exact Test 38.553
Linear-by-Linear
35.384c 1
.000
.000b
.000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
503
a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.26.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 92208573.
c. The standardized statistic is -5.948.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and level of education. The Cramer’s V was .27, suggesting a moderate
association between the two variables. As such, managers were more likely to have
completed Bachelor’s degree (28.6%) compared to workers, (16.9%) as well as Master’s
degrees (14.0%) compared to workers (4.6%). Conversely, workers were more likely to
have completed only some high school or GED (37.4%) compared to managers
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(19.16%), and more likely to have completed some college (37.95%) when compared to
managers (32.8%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by taken a leadership program. A Chi-square test of independence
was calculated to determine the relationship between management status (manager versus
worker) and attendance in a leadership program. Participants were asked to report
whether they had taken a leadership program by answering either yes or no. The
relationship between these variables was significant,  2(1, N=501) = 52.23, p<.001. (See
Figure 24 below).

Figure 24. Manager by taken a leadership program.

121
Table 4
Manager by Taken a Leadership Program
Chi-Square Testsc
Value

Df

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000
.000

Exact Sig. (2sided)
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
52.233a
1
b
Continuity Correction
50.916
1
Likelihood Ratio
53.224
1
.000
Fisher's Exact Test
.000
Linear-by-Linear Association
52.129d
1
.000
.000
N of Valid Cases
501
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 94.58.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
c. For 2x2 crosstabulation, exact results are provided instead of Monte Carlo results.
d. The standardized statistic is 7.220.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and attendance in a leadership program. The Cramer’s V was .32,
suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As such, managers were
more likely to have taken a leadership program (64.4%) compared to workers (31.3%).
The graph below depicts this relationship.
Manager by leadership styles. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
leadership style. Participants were asked to determine their type of leadership style with
answers ranging from autocratic to participatory and free rein. The relationship between
these variables was significant,  2(2, N=489) = 9.80, p=.008.
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Figure 25. Manager by leadership styles.
Table 5
Manager by Leadership Styles
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.007
.007

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.007b .005
.009
b
.008
.006
.010
.008b .006
.010
.002b .001
.003

Pearson Chi-Square
9.908a
2
Likelihood Ratio
9.849
2
Fisher's Exact Test
9.795
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.475c
1
.002
N of Valid Cases
489
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.80.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 79654295.
c. The standardized statistic is 3.078.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and type of leadership style. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a
weak association between the two variables. As such, managers were more likely to have
an autocratic leadership style (29.3%) compared to workers (20.1%). Conversely,
workers were more likely to have free rein leadership style (16.9%) when compared to
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managers (9.0%). Additionally, both managers (61.7%) and workers (63.0%) had similar
rates of participatory leadership styles.
Manager by implementation of a successful safety program. A Chi-square test
of independence was calculated to determine the relationship between management status
(manager versus worker) and whether their organization has implemented a successful
safety program. Participants were asked to rate their organization having a successful
safety program with answers ranging from strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or
disagree, agree, and strongly agree. The relationship between these variables was
significant,  2(4, N=496) = 12.34, p=.014.

Figure 26. Manager by implementation of a successful safety program.
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Table 6
Manager by Implementation of a Successful Safety Program
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.013
.014

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.011
.009
.014
.016b
.013
.020
.014b
.011
.017

Pearson Chi-Square 12.759a
4
Likelihood Ratio 12.465
4
Fisher's Exact Test 12.338
Linear-by-Linear
2.805c
1
.094
.101b
.093
.108
Association
N of Valid Cases 496
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.81.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1810951851.
c. The standardized statistic is -1.675.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and whether they agree that their organization implemented a
successful safety program. The Cramer’s V was .16, suggesting a weak association
between the two variables. As such, managers were slightly more likely to agree that their
organization had implemented a successful safety program (68.8%), compared to workers
(63.5%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by commitment to safety. A Chi-square test of independence was
calculated to determine the relationship between management status (manager versus
worker) and top managers having a strong commitment to safety. Participants were asked
to rate their level of agreement that top managers have a strong commitment to safety,
with answers ranging from strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree,
and strongly agree. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4,
N=493) = 11.60, p=.017.
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Figure 27. Manager by commitment to safety.
Table 7
Manager by Commitment to Safety
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.018
.020

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
.015b
.012
.018
.021b
.017
.024
.017b
.014
.020

Pearson Chi-Square 11.907a
4
Likelihood Ratio
11.612
4
Fisher's Exact Test 11.598
Linear-by-Linear
2.534c
1
.111
.117b
.109
.125
Association
N of Valid Cases
493
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.01.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 762367465.
c. The standardized statistic is -1.592.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and top managers having a strong commitment to safety. The
Cramer’s V was .16, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. As such,
managers were slightly more likely to agree that top managers have a strong commitment
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to safety (64.8%), compared to workers (56.3%) and were also more likely to strongly
agree (19.9%), compared to workers (18.2%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by prioritize safety on a daily basis. A Chi-square test of
independence was calculated to determine the relationship between management status
(manager versus worker) and whether their direct manager prioritizes safety on a daily
basis. Participants were asked to rate the level that they agree that their direct manager
prioritizes safety, with answers ranging from strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or
disagree, agree, and strongly agree. The relationship between these variables was not
significant,  2(4, N=495) = 9.50, p=.051.

Figure 28. Manager by prioritize safety on a daily basis.
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Table 8
Manager by Prioritizing Safety on a Daily Basis
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.048
.042
.053
.057b
.051
.063
.051b
.045
.056

Pearson Chi-Square 9.667a 4
.046
Likelihood Ratio
9.453 4
.051
Fisher's Exact Test 9.504
Linear-by-Linear
3.166c 1
.075
.081b
.074
.088
Association
N of Valid Cases
495
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.10.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 762367465.
c. The standardized statistic is -1.779.

Manager by CSS1. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
reacting quickly to solve the problem when advised of safety hazards. Participants were
asked to rate the level of importance to react quickly when advised of safety hazards,
with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=479) =
19.37, p<.001.

128

Figure 29. Manager by CSS1.
Table 9
Manager by CSS1
Chi-Square Tests
Value

Df

Asymp. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig. (2- Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
sided)
Lower Bound Upper Bound

Pearson Chi-Square
19.009a
4
.001
.001b
.000
.001
Likelihood Ratio
19.027
4
.001
.001b
.000
.002
Fisher's Exact Test
19.367
.000b
.000
.001
Linear-by-Linear
16.055c
1
.000
.000b
.000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
479
a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .77.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1388918686.
c. The standardized statistic is -4.007.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and the reacting quickly when advised of safety hazards. The
Cramer’s V was .20, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As
such, managers were more likely to rate reacting quickly to safety hazards as essential
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(53.7.9%), compared to workers (35.1%). Conversely, workers were more likely to view
reacting quickly as high priority (44.3%) when compared to managers (35.7%). The
graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS2. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
insistence on thorough regular safety audits and inspections. Participants were asked to
rate the level of importance of regular safety audits and inspections with answers ranging
from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and essential. The
relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=479) = 17.75, p=.001.

Figure 30. Manager by CSS2.
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Table 10
Manager by CSS2
Chi-Square Tests
Value

Df

Asymp. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig. (2- Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
sided)
Lower
Upper Bound
Bound
.001
.001b .000
.002
.001
.002b .001
.003
.001b .000
.002
b
.000
.000
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
17.612a 4
Likelihood Ratio
17.768
4
Fisher's Exact Test
17.751
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.226c 1
N of Valid Cases
479
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.32.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -3.902.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and insistence on thorough regular safety audits and inspections. The
Cramer’s V was .19, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. As such,
managers were more likely to rate thorough regular safety audits and inspections as
essential (38.8%), compared to workers (23.2%). Conversely, workers were more likely
to view safety audits and inspections as a high priority (49.7%) when compared to
managers (44.6%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS3. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
working to continually improve safety levels in all departments. Participants were asked
to rate the level of importance of continuing to improve safety levels in all departments
with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=478) =
26.02, p<.001.
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Figure 31. Manager by CSS3.
Table 11
Manager by CSS3
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.001
.001

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.001
.000
.002
.002b
.001
.003
.001b
.000
.002

Pearson Chi-Square
17.612a 4
Likelihood Ratio
17.768 4
Fisher's Exact Test
17.751
Linear-by-Linear
15.226c 1
.000
.000b
.000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
479
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.32.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -3.902.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and working to continually improve safety levels in all departments.
The Cramer’s V was .23, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables.
As such, managers were more likely to rate working to continually improve safety levels
as essential (42.9%), compared to workers (32.61%) and as a high priority (45.6%)
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compared to workers (41.85%). Conversely, workers were more likely to view working
to continually improve safety levels as a medium priority (16.3%) when compared to
managers (10.2%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS4. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
providing all the equipment necessary to do the job safely. Participants were asked to rate
the level of importance of providing necessary equipment with answers ranging from not
a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and essential. The relationship
between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=477) = 24.18, p<.001.

Figure 32. Manager by CSS4.
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Table 12
Manager by CSS4
Chi-Square Tests
Value

Df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.000
.000
.000
.000b .000
.000
.000b .000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
24.303a
4
Likelihood Ratio
24.271
4
Fisher's Exact Test
24.182
Linear-by-Linear
21.388c
1
.000
.000b .000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
477
a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.55.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -4.625.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and providing all the equipment necessary to do the job safely. The
Cramer’s V was .23, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As
such, managers were more likely to rate providing all the necessary equipment as
essential (64.4%), compared to workers (43.2%). Conversely, workers were more likely
to view providing all the necessary equipment as a high priority (41.1%) when compared
to managers (29.1%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS5. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
being strict about continuing to work safely when work falls behind schedule.
Participants were asked to rate the importance of being strict about continuing to work
safely with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high
priority, and essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4,
N=479) = 20.92, p<.001.
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Figure 33. Manager by CSS5.
Table 13
Manager by CSS5
Chi-Square Tests
Value

Df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
20.918a 4
Likelihood Ratio
21.336
4
Fisher's Exact Test
20.922
Linear-by-Linear
20.253c 1
.000
.000b
.000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
479
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .39.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and being strict about continuing to work safely when work falls
behind schedule. The Cramer’s V was .21, suggesting a moderate association between the
two variables. As such, managers were more likely to rate being strict about continuing to
work safely as essential (51.4%), compared to workers (32.4%). Conversely, workers
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were more likely to view being strict about continuing to work safely as a high priority
(46.5%) when compared to managers (38.1%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS6. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
quickly correcting any safety hazard despite cost. Participants were asked to rate the level
of importance of quickly correcting any safety hazard with answers ranging from not a
priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and essential. The relationship
between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=479) = 20.36, p<.001.

Figure 34. Manager by CSS6.
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Table 14
Manager by CSS6
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.000
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
20.883a 4
Likelihood Ratio
21.819 4
Fisher's Exact Test
20.357
Linear-by-Linear
20.160c 1
.000
.000b
.000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
479
a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.16.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -4.490.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and quickly correcting any safety hazard despite cost. The
Cramer’s V was .21, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As
such, managers were more likely to rate quickly responding to safety hazard as essential
(56.8%), compared to workers (38.9%). Conversely, workers were more likely to view
quickly responding to safety hazard a high priority (40.5%) when compared to managers
(33.3%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS7. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
providing detailed safety reports to workers. Participants were asked to rate the level of
importance of providing detailed safety reports with answers ranging from not a priority,
low priority, medium priority, high priority, and essential. The relationship between these
variables was significant,  2(4, N=477) = 16.65, p=.002.
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Figure 35. Manager by CSS7.
Table 15
Manager by CSS7
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.002
.002

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.002
.001
.003
.003b
.002
.004
.002b
.001
.003

Pearson Chi-Square
16.534a 4
Likelihood Ratio
16.607
4
Fisher's Exact Test
16.649
Linear-by-Linear
10.676c 1
.001
.001b
.000
.002
Association
N of Valid Cases
477
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.10.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -3.267.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and providing detailed safety reports to workers. The Cramer’s V was
.19, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. As such, managers were
more likely to rate providing detailed safety reports to workers as essential (44.2%),
compared to workers (28.1%). Conversely, workers were more likely to view providing
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detailed safety reports as a high priority (43.8%) when compared to managers (34.3%).
The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS8. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
considering a worker’s safety behavior when moving or promoting people. Participants
were asked to rate the level of importance of considering a worker’s safety behavior with
answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=478) =
22.65, p<.001.

Figure 36. Manager by CSS8
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Table 16
Manager by CSS8
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.000
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
22.970a 4
Likelihood Ratio
23.728
4
Fisher's Exact Test
22.652
Linear-by-Linear
21.022c 1
.000
.000b
.000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
478
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .77.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -4.585.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and considering a worker’s safety behaviors when moving or
promoting people. The Cramer’s V was .22, suggesting a moderate association between
the two variables. As such, managers were more likely to rate considering a worker’s
safety behavior as essential (53.2%), compared to workers (33.5%). Conversely, workers
were more likely to view considering a worker’s safety behavior as a high priority
(40.0%) when compared to managers (33.1%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS9. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
requiring each manager to help improve safety in his/her department. Participants were
asked to rate the level of importance of requiring each manager to help improve safety in
his/her department with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium
priority, high priority, and essential. The relationship between these variables was
significant,  2(4, N=478) = 29.76, p<.001.
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Figure 37. Manager by CSS9.
Table 17
Manager by CSS9
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig. (2sided) Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound

Pearson Chi-Square
29.860a 4
.000
.000b .000
.000
Likelihood Ratio
31.332
4
.000
.000b .000
.000
Fisher's Exact Test
29.764
.000b .000
.000
c
b
Linear-by-Linear Association 25.649
1
.000
.000 .000
.000
N of Valid Cases
478
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.16.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -5.064.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and providing all the equipment necessary to do the job safely. The
Cramer’s V was .25, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As
such, managers were more likely to rate requiring each manager to help improve safety in
his/her department as essential (45.7%), compared to workers (24.3%). Conversely,
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workers were more likely to view requiring each manager to help improve safety as a
high priority (49.19%) when compared to managers (41.3%) or as a medium priority
(21.1%) when compared to workers (10.2%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS10. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
investing a lot of time and money in safety training for workers. Participants were asked
to rate the level of importance of investing a lot of time and money in safety training with
answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=475) =
22.02, p<.001.

Figure 38. Manager by CSS10.
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Table 18
Manager by CSS10
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.000
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.001
.000b
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
22.003a 4
Likelihood Ratio
22.059 4
Fisher's Exact Test
22.020
Linear-by-Linear
19.412c 1
.000
.000b
.000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
475
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.91.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -4.406.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and investing a lot of time and money in safety training for workers.
The Cramer’s V was .22, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables.
As such, managers were more likely to rate investing a lot of time and money in safety
training as essential (39.8%), compared to workers (23.2%). Conversely, workers were
more likely to view investing a lot of time and money in safety training as a high priority
(43.1%) when compared to managers (39.1%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS11. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
using any available information to improve existing safety rules. Participants were asked
to rate the level of importance of using any available information to improve existing
safety rules with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high
priority, and essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4,
N=478) = 18.47, p=.001.
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Figure 39. Manager by CSS11.
Table 19
Manager by CSS11
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

Value

df

4
4

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.001
.001

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.001b
.000
.001
.001b
.000
.002
.001b
.000
.002

18.515a
18.751
18.471
16.640c

1

.000

.000b

.000

.000

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and using any available information to improve existing safety rules.
The Cramer’s V was .20, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables.
As such, managers were more likely to rate using any available information to improve
existing safety rules as essential (40.6%), compared to workers (24.3%). Conversely,
workers were more likely to view using any information to improve safety rules a high
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priority (48.1%) when compared to managers (41.6%). The graph above depicts this
relationship.
Manager by CSS12. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
listening carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safety. Participants were asked to
rate the level of importance of listening to workers’ ideas about improving safety with
answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=478) =
20.66, p<.001.

Figure 40. Manager by CSS12.
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Table 20
Manager by CSS12
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.000
.000
.000
.000b .000
.000
.000b .000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
20.971a
4
Likelihood Ratio
21.825
4
Fisher's Exact Test
20.664
Linear-by-Linear
19.953c
1
.000
.000b .000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
478
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .77.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -4.467.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and the listening carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safety.
The Cramer’s V was .21, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables.
As such, managers were more likely to rate listening to workers as essential (42.7%),
compared to workers (25.4%). Conversely, workers were more likely to view listening to
workers a high priority (46.5%) when compared to managers (41.3%). The graph above
depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS13. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
considering safety when setting production speed and schedules. Participants were asked
to rate the level of importance of considering safety when setting production speed and
schedules with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high
priority, and essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4,
N=476) = 14.39, p=.003.
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Figure 41. Manager by CSS13.
Table 21
Manager by CSS13
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.006
.006

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.004
.002
.006
.007b .005
.009
.003b .002
.005

Pearson Chi-Square
14.340a 4
Likelihood Ratio
14.423
4
Fisher's Exact Test
14.385
Linear-by-Linear
9.366c
1
.002
.002b .001
.003
Association
N of Valid Cases
476
a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.54.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -3.060.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and considering safety when setting production speed and schedules.
The Cramer’s V was .17, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. As
such, managers were more likely to rate considering safety when setting production speed
and schedules as essential (50.2%), compared to workers (33.9%). Conversely, workers
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were more likely to view considering safety when setting production speed and schedules
as a high priority (46.5%) when compared to managers (36.2%). The graph above depicts
this relationship.
Manager by CSS14. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
providing workers with a lot of information on safety issues. Participants were asked to
rate the level of importance of providing workers with a lot of information on safety
issues with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high
priority, and essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4,
N=475) = 20.77, p<.001.

Figure 42. Manager by CSS14.
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Table 22
Manager by CSS14
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.000
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.001
.000b
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
20.830a
4
Likelihood Ratio
20.675
4
Fisher's Exact Test
20.766
Linear-by-Linear
19.730c
1
.000
.000b
.000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
475
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.94.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -4.442.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and the providing workers with a lot of information on safety issues.
The Cramer’s V was .21, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables.
As such, managers were more likely to rate providing workers with a lot of information
as essential (51.6%), compared to workers (34.2%). Conversely, workers were slightly
more likely to view providing a lot of information as a high priority (37.0%) when
compared to managers (34.7%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
Manager by CSS15. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
regularly holding safety-awareness events. Participants were asked to rate the level of
importance of regularly holding safety-awareness events with answers ranging from not a
priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and essential. The relationship
between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=475) = 19.45, p=.001.

149

Figure 43. Manager by CSS15.
Table 23
Manager by CSS15
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association

Value

df

19.480a
19.550
19.452

4
4

17.492c

1

Asymp. Sig. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
(2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.001
.001b
.000
.001
.001
.001b
.000
.002
.001b
.000
.001
.000

.000b

.000

.000

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and regularly holding safety-awareness events. The Cramer’s V was
.20, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As such, managers
were more likely to rate regularly holding safety-awareness events as essential (39.4%),
compared to workers (23.5%). Conversely, workers were slightly more likely to view
regularly holding safety-awareness events as a high priority (38.3%) when compared to
managers (34.6%). The graph above depicts this relationship.
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Manager by CSS16. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and
giving safety personnel the power they need to do their job. Participants were asked to
rate the level of importance of giving safety personnel the power they need to do their job
with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=477) =
19.01, p<.001.

Figure 44. Manager by CSS16.
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Table 24
Manager by CSS16
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.001
.001

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.000
.000
.001
.001b .000
.002
.000b .000
.001

Pearson Chi-Square 19.251a 4
Likelihood Ratio
18.947
4
Fisher's Exact Test 19.006
Linear-by-Linear
16.904c 1
.000
.000b .000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
477
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.55.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214.
c. The standardized statistic is -4.111.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
managerial status and giving safety personnel the power they need to do their job. The
Cramer’s V was .20, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As
such, managers were more likely to rate giving safety personnel the power they need to
do their job as essential (49.0%), compared to workers (35.1%). Conversely, workers
were equally as likely to view giving safety personnel power they need to do their job as
a high priority (40.0%) when compared to managers (40.1%). The graph above depicts
this relationship.
Leadership Styles on Climate and Culture of Safety
Leadership styles by importance of construction contract. A Chi-square test of
independence was calculated to determine the relationship between leadership
(autocratic, participatory, and free rein) styles and the importance of construction
contract. Participants were asked to rate the importance of the construction contract with
answers ranging from not very important, not important, neither, important, and very
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2

important. The relationship between these variables was significant, χ (4, N=495) =
17.22, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 45. Leadership Styles by Importance of Construction Contract
Table 25
Leadership Styles by Importance of Construction Contract
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.028
.035

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.031b .027
.036
b
.044
.039
.049
.009b .007
.012

Pearson Chi-Square
17.216a 8
Likelihood Ratio
16.569
8
Fisher's Exact Test
18.123
Linear-by-Linear
2.666c
1
.103
.114b .105
.122
Association
N of Valid Cases
495
a. 8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .73.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784.
c. The standardized statistic is -1.633.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the importance of the construction contract. The Cramer’s V was
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.13, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. While a majority of
managers consider the construction contract as “very important”, autocratic leadership
scored the highest (71.9%), compared to participatory (66.8%) and free rein leaders
(53.3%). Conversely, the trend is opposite with regard to the category of “importance”
with free rein leaders ranked the highest at 35%, compared to participatory (30%) and
autocratic (21.9%) leaders.
Leadership styles by levels of education. A Chi-square test of independence was
calculated to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and
free rein) styles and educational level. Participants were asked to rank their educational
level with answers including: did not complete high school, high school/GED, some
college, bachelor degree, Master’s degree, and advanced graduate work or PhD level. The
relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(10, N=497) = 23.63, p<.05. The
null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 46. Leadership Styles by Levels of Education
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Table 26
Leadership Styles by Levels of Education
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig. (2- Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
sided)
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.009
.010
.007
.012
.006
.008b
.006
.010
.006b
.004
.008
.055
.060b
.054
.066

Pearson Chi-Square
23.627a 10
Likelihood Ratio
24.765 10
Fisher's Exact Test
23.193
Linear-by-Linear Association3.692c 1
N of Valid Cases
497
a. 4 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.23.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784.
c. The standardized statistic is -1.921.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and educational level. The Cramer’s V was .15, suggesting a weak
association between the two variables. Compared to its cohorts, free rein leaders are more
likely to report some college (44.26%), autocratic leaders Master’s degree (14.84%), and
participatory leaders bachelor’s degree (28.57%). It is interesting to note that a majority
of respondents reported having attained some high school/GED or some college degrees.
For instance, 44.26% of free rein leaders reported having attained some college degree
while 32.79% reported attaining high school/GED degrees.
Leadership styles by leadership program. A Chi-square test of independence
was calculated to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory,
and free rein) styles and whether or not the subjects participated in a leadership program.
The relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(2, N=495) = 7.09, p<.05. The
null hypothesis is rejected.
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Figure 47.Leadership Styles by Leadership Program
Table 27
Leadership Styles by Leadership Program
Chi-Square Tests
Value

Df

Asymp. Sig. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
(2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.029
.031b
.027
.035
.028
.030b
.026
.035
b
.031
.027
.035

Pearson Chi-Square
7.089a
2
Likelihood Ratio
7.137
2
Fisher's Exact Test
7.061
Linear-by-Linear
5.852c
1
.016
.019b
.016
.023
Association
N of Valid Cases
495
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 29.81.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784.
c. The standardized statistic is 2.419.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and whether participants had taken a leadership program. The Cramer’s
V was .12, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. It is interesting to
note that leaders differ in regard to taking leadership styles; autocratic leaders were more
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likely to say “yes” to taking a leadership style (57.5%) when compared to participatory
(52.6%) and free rein leaders (37.1%). Conversely, free rein leaders were more likely to
say “no” to taking a leadership style (62.9%), compared to participatory (47.4%) and
autocratic leaders (42.5%).
Leadership styles by implementation of successful safety program. A Chisquare test of independence was calculated to determine the relationship between
leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) styles and participant’s perception of
whether their organization has implemented a successful safety program. Respondents
had options ranging from “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree or disagree”,
“agree”, or “strongly agree.” The relationship between these variables was significant,
χ2(2, N=495) = 7.09, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 48. Leadership styles by implementation of successful safety program
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Table 28
Leadership Styles by Implementation of a Successful Safety Program
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig. (2- Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
sided)
Lower Bound Upper Bound

Pearson Chi-Square
20.679a 8
.008
.009b
.006
.011
Likelihood Ratio
19.399 8
.013
.016b
.012
.019
Fisher's Exact Test
19.715
.008b
.006
.010
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.694c
1
.017
.017b
.014
.020
N of Valid Cases
499
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.86.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.386.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and implementation of a successful safety program. The Cramer’s V was
.14, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Autocratic leaders (66.4%)
and participatory leaders (69.6%) were more likely to “agree” when compared to free rein
leaders (53.23%). Furthermore, autocratic leaders (18.75%) were more likely to “strongly
agree” with the statement, compared to participatory leaders (13.59%) and free rein
leaders (14.52%)
Leadership styles by strong commitment to safety. A Chi-square test of
independence was calculated to determine the relationship between leadership
(autocratic, participatory, and free rein) styles and commitment to safety. Respondents
were asked whether they believed that their top managers had a strong commitment to
safety; the choices were: “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree or disagree”,
“agree”, or “strongly agree.” The relationship between these variables was significant,
χ2(8, N=496) = 27.32, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected.
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Figure 49. Leadership styles by strong commitment to safety
Table 28
Leadership Styles by Strong Commitment to Safety
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.001
.001

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.001
.000
.002
.003b .001
.004
.002b .001
.002

Pearson Chi-Square
27.323a 8
Likelihood Ratio
25.444
8
Fisher's Exact Test
24.654
Linear-by-Linear
15.084c 1
.000
.000b .000
.001
Association
N of Valid Cases
496
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.38.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784.
c. The standardized statistic is -3.884.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and strong commitment to safety by top managers. The Cramer’s V was
.16, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Autocratic leaders (61.1%)
and participatory leaders (64.0%) were more likely to “agree” when compared to free rein
leaders (50.0%). Furthermore, autocratic leaders (25.4%) were more likely to “strongly
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agree” with the statement, compared to participatory leaders (17.5%) and free rein leaders
(12.9%).
Leadership styles by direct manager prioritizing safety. A Chi-square test of
independence was calculated to determine the relationship between leadership
(autocratic, participatory, and free rein) styles and direct manager prioritizing safety.
Respondents were asked whether they believed that their direct managers prioritize
safety; the choices ranged from “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree or
disagree”, “agree”, or “strongly agree.” The relationship between these variables was
significant, χ2(8, N=498) = 34.60, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 50. Leadership styles by direct manager prioritizing safety
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Table 29
Leadership Styles by Direct Manager Prioritizing Safety
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp. Sig. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
(2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.000
.000
.000
.001
.000
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
34.604a 8
Likelihood Ratio
32.325 8
Fisher's Exact Test
32.114
Linear-by-Linear
6.877c
1
.009
.010b
.007
.012
Association
N of Valid Cases
498
a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.74.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.622.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and direct manager prioritizing safety on a daily basis. The Cramer’s V
was .18, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Autocratic leaders
(53.42%) and participatory leaders (66.340%) were more likely to “agree” when
compared to free rein leaders (43.0%). Furthermore, autocratic leaders (22.81%) were
more likely to “strongly agree” with the statement, compared to participatory leaders
(13.27%) and free rein leaders (12.9%). Thus, when it comes to direct manager
prioritizing safety, participatory leaders are more likely to “agree”, autocratic leaders
“strongly agree”, and free rein “neither agree or disagree.”
Leadership styles by feeling safe. A Chi-square test of independence was
calculated to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and
free rein) styles and feeling safe. Respondents were asked whether they believed that they
feel safe; the choices ranged from “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree or
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disagree”, “agree”, or “strongly agree.” The relationship between these variables was
significant, χ2(8, N=497) = 17.21, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 51. Leadership Styles by Feeling Safe
Table 30
Leadership Styles by Feeling Safety
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.028
.052

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.026b
.021
.030
.071b
.064
.077
.029b
.024
.033

Pearson Chi-Square
17.200a
8
Likelihood Ratio
15.367
8
Fisher's Exact Test
16.042
Linear-by-Linear
3.248c
1
.072
.073b
.066
.079
Association
N of Valid Cases
497
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.81.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784.
c. The standardized statistic is -1.802.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and feeling safe. The Cramer’s V was .13, suggesting a weak association
between the two variables. Autocratic leaders (63.28%) and participatory leaders
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(71.84%) were more likely to “agree” when compared to free rein leaders (61.67%).
Furthermore, autocratic leaders (23.44%) were more likely to “strongly agree” with the
statement, compared to participatory leaders (18.12%) and free rein leaders (16.67%).
Thus, when it comes to direct manager prioritizing safety, participatory leaders are more
likely to “agree”, autocratic leaders “strongly agree”, and free rein “neither agree or
disagree.”
Leadership styles by organizational size. A Chi-square test of independence
was calculated to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory,
and free rein) styles and organizational size. Choices for organizational size ranged from
1-50, 51-250, 251-500, 501-1,000, and 1,000+. The relationship between these variables
was significant, χ2(8, N=499) = 18.65, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 52. Leadership styles by organizational size
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Table 31
Leadership Styles by Organizational Size
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.017
.016

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.018
.014
.021
.021b .017
.024
.021b .017
.024
.036b .031
.041

Pearson Chi-Square
18.659a 8
Likelihood Ratio
18.803 8
Fisher's Exact Test
17.838
Linear-by-Linear Association4.331c
1
.037
N of Valid Cases
499
a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.98.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 23202691.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.081.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and organizational size. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a weak
association between the two variables. While a majority of the participants belonged to
organizations between 1-50 workers, free rein leaders particularly had the highest
concentration at 69.4%, followed by autocratic leaders at 48.4%, and participatory
leaders at 43.4%. Compared to free rein and autocratic leaders, participatory leaders were
more present with larger organizations: 27.8% for 51-250 size and 16.5% for 201-500
size. This is also the case for autocratic leaders.
Leadership styles by CSS1. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to how quickly the organization solves
the problem when advised of safety hazards. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low
priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between
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these variables was not significant, χ (8, N=485) = 13.73, p>.05. The null hypothesis is
2

accepted.
Leadership styles by CSS2. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to insisting on thorough regular safety
audits and inspection. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium
priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was
not significant, χ2(8, N=485) = 13.74, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.

Figure 53. Leadership Styles by CSS2
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Table 32
Leadership Styles by CSS2
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.026
.041

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.029
.024
.033
.053b .047
.059
.023b .019
.026

Pearson Chi-Square
17.463a 8
Likelihood Ratio
16.108 8
Fisher's Exact Test
17.131
Linear-by-Linear
7.357c
1
.007
.008b .006
.010
Association
N of Valid Cases
485
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .74.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.712.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey relating to insisting on thorough
regular safety audits and inspection. The Cramer’s V was .10, suggesting a weak
association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were more
likely to view regular safety audits and inspections as “essential” and “high priority”
while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their counterparts and were more likely to
consider it as “medium priority.” That is, free rein leaders were evenly split between
viewing CSS2 as “medium priority,” “high priority,” and “essential.”
Leadership styles by CSS3. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to working to continually improve safety
levels in all departments. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium
priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was
not significant, χ2(8, N=484) = 9.86, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
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Leadership styles by CSS4. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to providing all of the equipment
necessarily to do the job well. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”,
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these
variables was not significant, χ2(8, N=483) = 14.85, p>.05. The null hypothesis is
accepted.
Leadership styles by CSS5. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to being strict about continuing to work
safely when work falls behind schedule. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low
priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between
these variables was significant, χ2(8, N=485) = 23.48, p<.05. The null hypothesis is
rejected.

Figure 54. Leadership styles by CSS5
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Table 33
Leadership styles by CSS5
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.003
.017

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.005
.003
.006
.014b
.011
.017
.007b
.005
.010

Pearson Chi-Square
23.484a 8
Likelihood Ratio
18.696
8
Fisher's Exact Test
19.646
Linear-by-Linear
2.578c
1
.108
.115b
.107
.124
Association
N of Valid Cases
485
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955.
c. The standardized statistic is -1.606.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey relating to being strict about
continuing to work safely when work falls behind schedule. The Cramer’s V was .16,
suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory
leaders were more likely to view regular safety audits and inspections as “essential” and
“high priority” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their counterparts and were
more likely to consider it as “medium priority.” That is, free rein leaders were evenly
split between viewing CSS5 as “medium priority,” “high priority,” and “essential.”
Leadership styles by CSS6. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to quickly correcting any safety hazard
(even if costly). Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”,
“high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not
significant, χ2(8, N=485) = 14.41, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
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Leadership styles by CSS7. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to providing detailed safety reports to
workers (e.g. injuries, near accidents). Choices were “not a priority,” “low priority”,
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=483) = 16.77, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 55.Leadership styles by CSS7
Table 34
Leadership Styles by CSS7
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.033
.078

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.035b .031
.040
.094b .086
.101
.057b .051
.063
b
.002
.001
.003

Pearson Chi-Square
16.766a 8
Likelihood Ratio
14.140 8
Fisher's Exact Test
14.525
Linear-by-Linear Association10.716c 1
.001
N of Valid Cases
483
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.12.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955.
c. The standardized statistic is -3.274.
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A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey relating to being strict about
continuing to work safely when work falls behind schedule. The Cramer’s V was .16,
suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory
leaders were more likely to view regular safety audits and inspections as “essential” and
“high priority” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their counterparts and were
more likely to consider it as “medium priority.” That is, free rein leaders were evenly
split between viewing CSS7 as “medium priority,” “high priority,” and “essential.”
Leadership styles by CSS8. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to considering a worker’s safety behavior
when moving-promoting people. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”,
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=499) = 18.66, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 56. Leadership styles by CSS8
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Table 35
Leadership Styles by CSS8
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.012
.072

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.016
.013
.019
.080b
.073
.087
.050b
.044
.056

Pearson Chi-Square
19.513a 8
Likelihood Ratio
14.394
8
Fisher's Exact Test
14.503
Linear-by-Linear
6.269c
1
.012
.013b
.010
.016
Association
N of Valid Cases
484
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .37.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.504.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey relating to considering a worker’s
safety behavior when moving-promoting people. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a
weak association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were
more likely to consider a worker’s safety behavior when moving-promoting people as
“essential” and “high priority,” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their
counterparts and were more likely to consider it as “medium priority.” That is, free rein
leaders were evenly split between viewing CSS8 as “medium priority,” “high priority,”
and “essential.”
Leadership styles by CSS9. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to requiring each manager to help
improve safety in his/her department. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low
priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between
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these variables was significant, χ (8, N=483) = 23.68, p<.05. The null hypothesis is
rejected.

Figure 57. Leadership Styles by CSS9
Table 36
Leadership Styles by CSS9
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.003
.017

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.004
.003
.006
.021b .017
.024
.009b .006
.011
.007b .005
.009

Pearson Chi-Square
23.681a 8
Likelihood Ratio
18.551
8
Fisher's Exact Test
19.911
Linear-by-Linear Association7.437c
1
.006
N of Valid Cases
483
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .50.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.727.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey relating to requiring each manager to
help improve safety in his/her department. The Cramer’s V was .16, suggesting a weak
association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were more
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likely to consider a manager to help improve safety in his/her department as “essential”
and “high priority,” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their counterparts and
were more likely to consider it as “medium priority.” That is, free rein leaders were
evenly split between viewing CSS8 as “medium priority,” “high priority,” and
“essential.”
Leadership styles by CSS10. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to investing a lot of time and money in
safety training for workers. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”,
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=481) = 24.01, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 58.Leadership styles by CSS10
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Table 37
Leadership Styles by CSS10
Chi-Square Tests
Value

Df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.002
.009

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.003
.002
.005
.012b .009
.015
.009b .007
.012

Pearson Chi-Square
24.010a
8
Likelihood Ratio
20.426
8
Fisher's Exact Test
19.515
Linear-by-Linear
8.608c
1
.003
.004b .002
.005
Association
N of Valid Cases
481
a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .75.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.934.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey to investing a lot of time and money in
safety training for workers. The Cramer’s V was .16, suggesting a weak association
between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were more likely to
consider investing a lot of time and money in safety training as “essential”, “high
priority”, and “medium priority” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their
counterparts and were more likely to consider it as “medium priority” and “low priority.”
Leadership styles by CSS11. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to using any available information to
improve existing safety rules. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”,
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these
variables was not significant, χ2(8, N=484) = 13.21, p>.05. The null hypothesis is
accepted.
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Leadership styles by CSS12. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to listening carefully to worker’s ideas
about improving safety. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium
priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was
not significant, χ2(8, N=484) = 13.21, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Leadership styles by CSS13. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to considering safety when setting
production speed and schedules. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”,
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=482) = 26.75, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 59. Leadership Styles by CSS13
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Table 38
Leadership Styles by CSS13
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.001
.014

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.002
.001
.002
.018b .015
.022
.011b .008
.014

Pearson Chi-Square
26.749a 8
Likelihood Ratio
19.092
8
Fisher's Exact Test
18.751
Linear-by-Linear
5.567c
1
.018
.020b .016
.023
Association
N of Valid Cases
482
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .49.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.360.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey to considering safety when setting
production speed and schedules. The Cramer’s V was .17, suggesting a weak association
between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were more likely to
considering safety when setting production speed and schedules as “essential”, “high
priority”, and “medium priority,” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their
counterparts and ranged in “low priority”, “medium priority”, and “low priority.”
Leadership styles by CSS14. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to providing workers with a lot of
information on safety issues. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”,
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=480) = 42.28, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected.
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Figure 60. Leadership styles by CSS14
Table 39
Leadership Styles by CSS14
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.000
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
42.278a
8
Likelihood Ratio
37.103
8
Fisher's Exact Test
35.166
Linear-by-Linear
6.506c
1
.011
.013b
.010
.016
Association
N of Valid Cases
480
a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .61.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.551.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey to considering safety when setting
production speed and schedules. The Cramer’s V was .20, suggesting a moderate
association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were more
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likely to considering safety when setting production speed and schedules as “essential”,
“high priority”, and “medium priority,” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than
their counterparts and ranged in “low priority”, “medium priority”, and “low priority.”
Leadership styles by CSS15. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to regularly held safety-awareness events
(e.g., presentations, ceremonies). Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”,
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=481) = 15.86, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 61. Leadership styles by CSS15
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Table 40
Leadership Styles by CSS15
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.045
.076

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.044
.039
.049
.091b
.083
.098
.055b
.049
.061

Pearson Chi-Square
15.851a 8
Likelihood Ratio
14.245 8
Fisher's Exact Test
14.834
Linear-by-Linear
4.147c
1
.042
.045b
.040
.050
Association
N of Valid Cases
481
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.84.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.036.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey to considering safety when setting
production speed and schedules. The Cramer’s V was .13, suggesting a weak association
between the two variables. Autocratic leaders are more likely to view CSS15 as
“essential” by 39.8% when compared to participatory and free rein at 32.8% and 28.8%,
respectively. Participatory leaders are more likely to report it as “high priority” at 39.1%
compared to free rein and autocratic leaders at 30.5% and 29.3%, respectively.
Leadership styles by CSS16. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein)
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to regularly hold safety-awareness events
(e.g., presentations, ceremonies). Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, to
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=483) = 16.75, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.
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Figure 62. Leadership styles by CSS16
Table 41
Leadership Styles by CSS16
Chi-Square Tests
Value

Df

Asymp. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig. (2- Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
sided)
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.033
.036b .031
.041
.071
.088b .081
.095
.038b .033
.043
b
.042
.045
.039
.050

Pearson Chi-Square
16.751a 8
Likelihood Ratio
14.426 8
Fisher's Exact Test
15.494
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.125c
1
N of Valid Cases
483
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .61.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955.
c. The standardized statistic is -2.031.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey to considering safety when setting
production speed and schedules. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a weak association
between the two variables. Autocratic leaders are more likely to view CSS16 as
“essential” at 46.0% when compared to participatory and free rein at 43.0% and 42.4%,
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respectively. Participatory leaders are more likely to report it as “high priority” at 42.3%,
compared to free rein and autocratic leaders at 25.4% and 38.7%, respectively.
Organizational Size by Climate and Culture of Safety
Organizational size by educational level. A Chi-square test of independence
was calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size and educational
level. Participants were asked to rank their educational level with answers including: did
not complete high school, high school/GED, some college, bachelor’s degree, master’s
degree, and advanced graduate work or PhD level. The relationship between these
variables was significant, χ2(20, N=502) = 65.14, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 63. Organizational size by educational level
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Table 42
Organizational Size by Educational Level
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
20
.000
20
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
65.138a
Likelihood Ratio
67.837
Fisher's Exact Test
65.261
Linear-by-Linear
36.757c
1
.000 .000b
.000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
502
a. 11 cells (36.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .64.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 2000000.
c. The standardized statistic is 6.063.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between
organizational size and educational level. The Cramer’s V was .18, suggesting a weak
association between the two variables. It is interesting to note that 46.88% of those
belonging to 1000+ company size reported having some level of college, though slightly
positively skewed towards bachelor’s degree and above. Those belonging to 1-50
company size were less educated compared to their counterparts, with a majority
straddling between high school (35.0%) and some college (38.75%). Those belonging to
51-250 company size were slightly more educated, with the majority straddling between
some college (30.33%) and bachelor’s degree (34.43%). It is also interesting to note that
those with a master’s degree were more likely to belong to 51+ size organizations.
Organizational size by leadership program. A Chi-square test of independence
was calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size and whether or
not the participants took a leadership program. The relationship between these variables
was significant, χ2(4, N=502) = 36.02, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected.
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Figure 64. Organizational Size by Leadership Program
Table 44
Organizational Size by Leadership Program
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
4
.000
4
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000

Pearson Chi-Square
36.019a
Likelihood Ratio
36.682
Fisher's Exact Test
36.199
Linear-by-Linear
23.595c
1
.000 .000b
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
500
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.36.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 334431365.
c. The standardized statistic is -4.857.

.000

A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between
organizational size and whether or not they took a leadership program. The Cramer’s V
was .27, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Those belonging to
501-1000 were more likely to report taking a leadership program (74.29% compared to
25.71%), followed by 251-500 (67.61% compared to 32.39%), 51-250 (61.16%
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compared to 38.84%), and 100+ (59.38% compared to 40.63%). Consequently, those
who belong to the 1-50 organizational size were less likely to take a leadership program
with 61.41% reporting “no” compared to the 38.59% “yes.”
Organizational size by CSS1. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate
survey relating to how quickly the organization solved the problem when advised of
safety hazards. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”,
“high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not
significant, χ2(16, N=487) = 14.53, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Organizational size by CSS2. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate
survey relating to insisting on thorough, regular safety audits and inspections. Choices
ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, and
“essential.” The relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(16, N=487) =
39.03, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 65. Organizational size by CSS2
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Table 43
Organizational size by CSS2
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.001
.000

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.003
.002
.005
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.000
.000b
.000
.001

Pearson Chi-Square
39.031a 16
Likelihood Ratio
44.261
16
Fisher's Exact Test
38.667
Linear-by-Linear Association15.560c 1
.000
N of Valid Cases
487
a. 10 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1801792942.
c. The standardized statistic is 3.945.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between
organizational size and CSS2. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a weak association
between the two variables. Those belonging 500+ organization were more likely to view
CSS2 as essential, while those below 500 were more likely to view it as a “high priority.”
Thus, larger organizations were more likely to view CSS2 as more essential and high
priority when compared to its cohorts.
Organizational size by CSS3. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate
survey relating to working to continually improve safety levels in all departments.
Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, to “medium priority”, “high
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant,
χ2(16, N=486) = 22.393, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Organizational size by CSS4. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate
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survey relating to working to continually improve safety levels in all departments.
Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”,
and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, χ2(16,
N=485) = 10.16, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Organizational size by CSS5. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate
survey relating to being strict about continuing to work safely when work falls behind
schedule. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant,
χ2(16, N=485) = 9.137, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Organizational size by CSS6. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate
survey relating to quickly correcting any safety hazard (even if it is costly). Choices
ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, and
“essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, χ2(16, N=487) =
9.34, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Organizational size by CSS7. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate
survey relating to providing detailed safety reports to workers (e.g. injuries, near
accidents). Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”,
“high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not
significant, χ2(16, N=485) = 15.67, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
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Organizational size by CSS8. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate
survey relating to considering a worker’s safety behavior when moving-promoting
people. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant,
χ2(16, N=486) = 12.88, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Organizational size by CSS9. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate
survey relating to requiring each manager to help improve safety in his/her department.
Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”,
and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(16, N=485)
= 33.91, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 66. Organizational size by CSS9
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Table 44
Organizational Size by CSS9
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.006
.005

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.011
.008
.013
.004b
.003
.006
.005b
.003
.006

Pearson Chi-Square
33.908a 16
Likelihood Ratio
34.562
16
Fisher's Exact Test
31.378
Linear-by-Linear
7.752c
1
.005
.007b
.005
.009
Association
N of Valid Cases
485
a. 11 cells (44.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .26.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1801792942.
c. The standardized statistic is 2.784.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between
organizational size styles and CSS9. The Cramer’s V was .13 suggesting a very weak
association between the two variables. Those belonging 500+ organization were more
likely to view CSS9 as “essential” while those below 500 were more likely to view it as a
“high priority.”
Organizational size by CSS10. A Chi-square test of independence was
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture
of climate survey relating to investing a lot of time and money in safety training for
workers. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(16,
N=483) = 35.82, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.
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Figure 67. Organizational size by CSS10
Table 45
Organizational size by CSS10
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.003
.004

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.006b .004
.008
.005b .003
.007
.009b .006
.011

Pearson Chi-Square
35.821a 16
Likelihood Ratio
35.242 16
Fisher's Exact Test
30.064
Linear-by-Linear
15.440c 1
.000
.000b .000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
483
a. 8 cells (32.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .39.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1801792942.
c. The standardized statistic is 3.929.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between
organizational size styles and CSS10. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a weak
association between the two variables. Those belonging 500+ organization were more
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likely to view CSS10 as “essential” while those below 500 were more likely to view it as
a “high priority.”
Organizational size by CSS11. A Chi-square test of independence was
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture
of climate survey relating to using any available information to improve existing safety
rules. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant,
χ2(16, N=486) = 24.63, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Organizational size by CSS12. A Chi-square test of independence was
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture
of climate survey relating to listening carefully to worker’s ideas about improving safety.
Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”,
and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, χ2(16,
N=486) = 13.28, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Organizational size by CSS13. A Chi-square test of independence was
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture
of climate survey relating to considering safety when setting production speed and
schedule. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant,
χ2(16, N=484) = 18.50, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Organizational size by CSS14. A Chi-square test of independence was
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture
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of climate survey relating to providing workers with a lot of information on safety issues.
Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”,
and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, χ2(16,
N=482) = 10.58, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.
Organizational size by CSS15. A Chi-square test of independence was
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture
of climate survey relating to regularly holding safety-awareness events (e.g.,
presentations, ceremonies). Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”,
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these
variables was significant, χ2(16, N=483) = 28.77, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 68. Organizational size by CSS15
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Table 46
Organizational Size by CSS15
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Asymp.
Sig. (2sided)
.003
.004

Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
Sig.
99% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
b
.006
.004
.008
.005b .003
.007
.009b .006
.011

Pearson Chi-Square
35.821a 16
Likelihood Ratio
35.242 16
Fisher's Exact Test
30.064
Linear-by-Linear
15.440c 1
.000
.000b .000
.000
Association
N of Valid Cases
483
a. 8 cells (32.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .39.
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1801792942.
c. The standardized statistic is 3.929.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between
organizational size styles and CSS15. The Cramer’s V was .12, suggesting a weak
association between the two variables. Those belonging 500+ organization were more
likely to view CSS15 as “essential” while those below 500 were more likely to view it as
a “high priority” or “medium priority.”
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Chapter 6: Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations
While the study of safety within the construction industry has spanned over the
last three decades, the emphasis of safety as a systemic issue is a relatively new concept,
as is the need for full recognition by the construction industry of the powerful role it
plays as a key stakeholder in the systemic organizational interplay between the industry
and individual organizations regarding safety. Yet, the understanding of a need to protect
the worker is a topic with a robust history, including discussion, research, and debate
with roots in a struggle for the recognition that the labor force has a right not only to fair
wages, but also a safe work environment. This realization has been addressed in the fields
of politics and economics as well as the social sciences, but it has rarely addressed the
fact that the construction industry is in conflict with itself. The construction industry
neglects to effectively explore the multiplicity within the etiology of conflict—that of
the industry, the individual job site, the worker, and the manager—and the perception
of safety at the macro-level, the mezzo-level entities, and finally the micro-level
through specific work tasks. It is the cornerstone of not only understanding the
conflict, but of moving from awareness and comprehension to action and solutions
that are best explored through systems theory and the utilization of the Marxist
theory.
The study also rendered insight into better addressing the needs of small
construction companies that account for the largest portion of the industry. While
they may lack the resources of larger companies, because of their ability to
disseminate information and initiate organizational change more quickly as a result
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of their size, smaller companies may be in the position to implement more proactive
rather than reactive approaches to worker safety.
Purpose
Despite the creation of OSHA more than 30 years ago, the construction
industry has yet to effectively integrate a large-scale, sustainable, and replicable
model of construction safety initiated of and by the industry demanding the
emergence of forums that facilitate necessary discussions to ensure that management
does more than address safety at the macro-level (i.e., culture of safety). This
research argued that both managers and workers already put a high priority on safety.
Yet this does not seem to be enough, as the Construction Industry of and to itself has
been unable to effectively offer integrated solutions that would support a shift from
placing the blame on the worker to recognizing the true systemic nature of both the
industry and the activities it engenders at the construction job site. Furthermore, it
argued for the need to reevaluate at all levels of construction safety regarding policy
construct, the design, and the decision-making processes of those who rank highest in
the system hierarchy.
The purpose of this research was to explore the perception of climate of safety
among construction managers and workers and also to determine if there was a
relationship between the perception of safety and the three distinct leadership styles –
authoritarian, participatory, and free rein. Additionally, this study endeavored to find if
certain demographics within the construction industry had any statistical relevance
regarding the aforementioned areas of investigation. Specifically, the characteristics of
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age, gender, geographic location of the worker and/or manager, level of education, union
affiliation, and company size were utilized in an effort to further extrapolate any
interdependence between groups and variables.
This study was also interested in the macro-level conflict within the construction
industry, as this industry has continued to lead a very public call to action for job
site/worker safety. While construction safety has been the driving force behind all
projects, the levels of severe and fatal injuries across the continuum of the construction
field have surpassed all other industries. This issue is crucial to the industry as it is
inherently hazardous; as such, safety and the exposure of the worker to unsafe conditions,
unsafe acts, or a combination of both must be addressed.
Key Findings from Study
This study explored the different factors contributing to how safety is experienced
and perceived within construction organizations. It considered how managers and
workers regard safety, how the varying types of leadership style may perceive these
concerns differently, and finally how the size of the organization may influence the
prioritization of safety.
Managers and workers with regard to safety concerns
The first research question sought to explore the relationship between managerial
status and the perception of safety concerns. Specifically, it was concerned with the issue
of whether workers and managers were aligned with regard to safety concerns. While
most managers and workers were relatively similar in their level of agreement that safety
is of high importance in the work environment, there were several differences worth
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noting. First, although both managers and workers view the construction contract in
general, and regard safety specifically as important, managers tended to rate it at a higher
level of priority. Managers were also slightly more likely to report that their organization
had implemented successful safety programs and to endorse the idea that their top
managers have a strong commitment to safety. Compared to workers, managers were
more likely to emphasize the importance of helping to improve their safety department
and affording safety personnel the power they needed to do their job. Despite these
differences, having access to the necessary safety equipment was generally considered to
be a high priority despite managerial status or leadership styles.
Although workers viewed enforcing regular safety audits and inspections as a
priority, managers were more likely to view this as essential for the work environment.
Managers were also slightly more likely to promote investing time and money in safety
training, providing workers with information on safety issues, and holding safetyawareness events. Managers also tended to prioritize quick responses to safety hazards,
continuing to work safely, and considering safety when setting production speed and
schedules beyond workers. Furthermore, managers were more likely to put a higher
importance on listening to workers’ concerns and continuing to improve safety levels
regardless of leadership styles. Providing detailed safety reports and considering workers’
safety behavior when considering promotions was generally perceived to be a high
priority across both managerial positions despite leadership style.
Overall, while both managers and workers endorsed similar levels of importance
of the construction contract and safety concerns, managers were slightly more likely to
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consider their companies as having strong commitments to safety concerns and
improvements in the workplace. Furthermore, managers were also more concerned with
implementing safety programs and considering safety when developing the success and
productivity of their company.
Leadership styles with regard to safety concerns
The second research question explored whether different types of leadership
styles (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) differed in regard to the perception of
safety. While the majority of managers considered the construction contract and overall
safety concerns as very important, autocratic leaders tended to report a higher level of
importance across the different safety concerns and their commitment to safety compared
to the other leadership styles. This was found to be true because autocratic leaders tend to
develop in larger organizations where there are greater resources and a greater number of
codified policies and procedures set forth by macro-level management. Autocratic leaders
were more likely to perceive their construction site as safe when compared to free rein or
participatory leaders. Furthermore, they emphasized the importance of providing detailed
safety reports to workers (injuries, near accidents, etc.) above participatory and even
more so than those who adopted a free rein leadership style.
Although participatory leaders were more likely to consider safety a high priority
when compared to free rein leaders, autocratic leaders were more likely to place the
highest level of importance and commitment across all safety concerns. Autocratic and
participatory leaders tended to perceive their organizations as having implemented a
successful safety program and their top managers as having a strong commitment to
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prioritizing safety. They were also much more likely than free rein leaders to prioritize
the need to provide safety personnel the power to do their job, endorse regular safety
audits and inspections, and continue to work safely when work falls behind schedule.
Consequently, free rein leaders were less concerned about a worker’s safety behavior
when considering promotion or providing workers with information on safety issues
compared to the other two leadership styles. Autocratic leaders, followed by participatory
leaders, tended to place a greater emphasis on regular safety-awareness events compared
to free rein leaders.
The majority of managers across leadership styles tended to place a high level of
importance on correcting any safety hazard despite the cost. However, autocratic and
participatory leaders were more likely to not only endorse investment of time and money
in safety training, but also consider safety when setting production speed and schedules
compared to free rein leaders, who were less likely to report this aspect as an important
aspect in the work place.
These results suggested that autocratic leaders tended to perceive safety concerns
in general with the highest priority, while participatory leaders followed closely behind.
Individuals that identified with a free rein leadership style were less likely to rate these
concerns as high priorities. Furthermore, autocratic and participatory leaders tended to be
more interested in maintaining and correcting safety concerns in the work environment
despite the cost. Consequently, they were more likely to belong to larger organizations,
and larger organizations may have more resources to invest. Taking into consideration
organizational size, larger organizations were more likely to view investment in safety
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concerns as a higher priority when compared to smaller companies, despite managerial
status or leadership style. In essence, larger corporations were more likely to invest in the
maintenance and correction of safety in the work place. Furthermore, free rein leaders
tended to belong to smaller organizations of 1-50 workers, while participatory and
autocratic were more present within larger organizations.
Organizational size with regard to safety concerns
The third main research question sought to determine if organizational size
impacted the perception of safety. Organizational size did not differ in many aspects of
safety concerns in the work place. Across all organizational sizes, there was a high level
of importance and priority placed on improving safety levels and rules, continuing to
work safely when work falls behind schedule, providing detailed safety reports to
workers, considering a worker’s safety behavior during promotions, listening to workers
ideas about improving safety, considering safety when setting production speed and
schedule, providing workers with information on safety issues, or giving safety personnel
the power to do their job. Yet, managers in small companies were more likely to be free
rein leaders when compared to their mid and large-sized counterparts.
Managers, specifically autocratic or participatory leaders, were more likely to
prioritize safety audits and were more likely to belong to larger organizations. Those
belonging to larger organizations were also more likely to place a higher level of
importance on requiring each manager to help improve safety in his/her department.
They were also more likely to prioritize investment in safety training and safetyawareness events.
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In essence, the research suggested that larger organizations may place a greater
emphasis on each manager’s responsibility in creating a safer environment due to the fact
that they have a larger number of workers to maintain. They were also more likely to
have resources to invest in safety trainings and programs to ensure their commitment to
creating a safe work environment. Consequently, larger organizations were more likely to
have autocratic leaders, who, by nature, are concerned with following the rules and
regulations.
Recommendations for Future Research
This research explored the perception of safety climate on the construction jobsite
by both workers and managers. It also examined how the perception of safety climate
could be impacted by different leadership styles and how these findings could bring the
construction industry from one that is in conflict with itself to one that is focused on
understanding possible alternative ways to approach safety management. This study was
neither meant to show causation nor be predictive, but rather uncover the true nature of
why an industry that has a rich tradition of calling for a greater priority to be given to
measuring safety effectively has repeatedly been unable to do so. Many in the industry
did not know how to react when OSHA and the BLS reported an increase in 2015 in fatal
construction injuries, as this seemed counterintuitive to the programs, policies, and
procedures that had been implemented over the last decade and were meant to keep the
worker free from unsafe acts, unsafe conditions or a combination of both.
The reaction was unfortunately silence—or, at best, an inclination to regress into a
debate about lagging indicators and frequency—rather than severity in an attempt to
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make sense of what was clearly a flawed system and inadequate resources. To be
effective, construction safety must emphasize the need for an integrated safety
management approach involving macro, mezzo, and micro level directives starting at the
broadest level, the macro, and include policies and procedures such as those found in the
construction contract and subcontracts. When discussing the macro level constructs, it is
important to note that these forces are established at the highest level of management as a
means of creating a clear and concise blueprint upon which all safety decisions are
implemented, reinforced, and monitored. Furthermore, this approach uses a topdown/bottom-up approach regarding the dissemination of necessary safety-related issues.
When managed correctly and responsibly, these initiatives create a strong systemic
climate of safety that ultimately engenders the necessary and effective information loop
between management and the worker.
Jobsite relationships are based on communication. This communication becomes
the foundation upon which expectations are prioritized, as they first are documented in
writing, which must include measurable outcomes and leave no room for interpretation
when communicated to the worker (Parboteeah & Kapp, 2008). Building upon the
foundation of perception of climate of safety, the construction jobsite and the safety
issues influenced by leadership styles cannot be seen as resulting from one single safety
act or omission. More specifically, organizational influences, contracts, subcontracts,
master agreements, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts and unsafe
conditions or a combination of all, are where the real issue of understanding the problem
exists. Further, it allows for the potential of solutions to be realized when information is
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effectively categorized and, in turn, is extrapolated at each level by the inclusion of
groupings, trends, and relationships that are identified as a means of further recognizing
both overt and covert systemic failures.
The construction industry can no longer hide from its own flawed truth, one that
is highlighted by the reality that while hazardous in nature, it does not need to be unsafe.
Construction safety management is systemically flawed, and as such, the worker is at risk
from the moment he/she steps onto the construction jobsite.
This flawed formula for keeping the worker safe was the impetus for this
research. Future research must continue with a focus on perception of safety, as
perception appears to be a key to the actualization of a solution as a deeper
understanding; it is the only way in which to address this conflict and gain greater insight
into the extent by which it can be effectively applied to those means and methods that
drive construction safety management. As noted, this researcher found both workers and
managers cognizant of the importance of job site safety, yet even with this awareness, the
construction industry continues to be one that is both inherently hazardous and
unnecessarily dangerous. Practical implementation of more effective safety standards,
therefore, may be found in discussions regarding perceived safety climate and real-time
safety measures, as well as looking at the reasons for the disconnect between perception
of a safe workplace and the reality of above average catastrophic and fatal injuries. As a
result, it appears prudent that the industry look to the adoption of leadership styles that
meet the needs of each job site based on the criteria used in this research, rather than a
one-size fits all approach.
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Expected Contribution
This research marks an important contribution to the construction industry, as it
explored a niche within research that has long been ignored. Despite the inherent hazards
related to construction work, it would be highly suspect to assume that any worker, given
the choice and the awareness, would choose to work on a jobsite that is unsafe. This was
reflected in their responses that show that safety is perceived as important by workers
across the continuum of the industry. There was little deviation when expressed through
the lenses of age, gender, geographic location, company size, education, union affiliation,
and years as members of this specific workforce.
Given these results, the notion that this is an industry in conflict with itself is not
simply an idea but a statement of fact. If the construction industry is genuine in its
protestations for the need to keep the worker safe, it must recognize itself as not only a
party of the system, but at the highest level of the systemic hierarchy. As such, it holds
both the power and the responsibility for job site safety. The current research method
attempted to provide a window into creating a dialogue for resolution and change relating
to the relationships between leadership style and perceived climate of safety. It created
the potential to offer insight and inspiration regarding the ways in which the construction
industry can begin to understand itself as both part of the conflict as well as the solution,
a solution that allows managers the ability to better adapt and adopt leadership styles that
effectively meet the safety needs of those they were charged to protect, the worker.
The construction workforce is tasked daily to engage in activities that, by the very
nature of the industry, are potentially hazardous but do not need to be unsafe. By using
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this research and that of future studies, this researcher hopes that it will stimulate
discussion at all levels of construction safety management. This will allow for new means
and methods to better manage and measure safety in a manner that addresses the most
important aspect of any project, keeping the worker safe.
This research is aligned with those characteristics that drive the field of Conflict
Analysis and Resolution, specifically those focused on the facilitation of solutions that
honor the opinions of all parties and recognize that systemic conflict like construction
accidents do not manifest out of a single act or omission. This realization in turn allows
for the emergence of informed leaders/managers who are better prepared to understand
and address the needs of workers while permitting an environment for robust debate that
must ultimately lead to the design and implementation of new ideas and models of safety
that create links between production driven outcomes and the understanding that by
acknowledging workers’ perception of climate of safety, there comes the potential for a
reduction in workplace conflict(s) as well as an overall attenuation of safety related
anxieties.
Limitations of the Study
The primary limitation of this study was related to the fact that the country’s
workforce is not comprised solely of English speaking workers and thus may not be
completely representative of the entire construction industry in the United States. To that
end, this study was only made available to those proficient in English. While this is a
recognized restriction, as noted early in this research, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2015) recognized that 27.3% of the construction workforce is Hispanic, which makes it
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the largest ethnic minority in the industry. Yet, the assumption that all men and women in
construction who identify as Hispanic are unable to read, write, or speak English at a
level making them ineligible to partake in this study is a broad assumption. While
distinctive and recognized by this researcher as a limitation, it is also his hope that future
studies will include surveys offered in multiple languages.
It is also acknowledged that this study was web-based, allowing only those with
access to a Smart Device or computer with Internet access to participate. This limitation
is, according to Anderson (2015),
68% of U.S. adults have a smartphone, up from 35% in 2011, and tablet computer
ownership has edged up to 45% among adults, according to survey data from the
Pew Research Center. Smartphone ownership is nearing the saturation point with
some groups: 86% of those ages 18-29 have a smartphone, as do 83% of those
ages 30-49 with 85.1% percent of American homes having some sort of computer
with internet access. (para. 4)
Another limitation was the fact that while this study tested relationships between
leadership styles and perceived climate of safety, the relationships in and of themselves
do not dictate causation. That is, this study did not seek to prove that certain leadership
styles would not cause or lead to a safer climate of safety. Therefore, it was not meant to
engender proof of any causal relationship, leaving this for future study.
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Conclusion and Implications
This dissertation was focused on the reality that current interventions and
resources fall short of protecting the worker. While a core belief in worker safety
continues to permeate the industry in theory, the job tasks performed (e.g. climate of
safety) can be catastrophic, and fatal injuries continue to occur at an alarming rate. When
first instituted into conventional construction safety management, it was agreed that
safety must be a priority to successfully mitigate the potential for injury. This research
understands that safety cannot be reconciled if it is addressed as an obscure concept, and
workplace safety, safety management, and safety climate must be measured. It is a
sentiment substantiated in the work of Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991), who specifically
focused on finding ways in which to measure safety climate in an effort to decrease
incident rates.
Further evidence of the importance of continuing to carry out this kind of research
was reflected in the work of Hinze, Hallowell, and Baud (2013), who argued that
“accidents and injuries still occur repeatedly on sites and it appears [that] construction
safety has hit a plateau” (p 139). What made this research unique was its focus on the
need for awareness regarding the importance of understanding climate of safety. It
emphasized the lack of research regarding the potential for creating newly designed
proactive policies and procedures based on the perceptions of leadership styles and
climate of safety.
The literature review also reflected the need for recognizing that the root cause of
any construction accident was complex, as a result of the multi-faceted nature of the
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industry. The recognition also revealed that relying exclusively on secondary data is
simply not the solution when exploring more effective means and methods to keep the
worker safe. Despite the fact that accident statistics were historically relied upon
throughout the construction industry, Laitinen, Marjamäki, and Keijo (1999) further
elucidated that it was almost impossible to use accidents as a safety indicator for a single
building construction site. They stated that “This is because of random variation where
many sites will have no accidents, and it is not possible to determine whether these sites
with zero accidents were safer than sites with accidents” (pp. 463-464).
Therefore, as a result of the complexity of construction safety management and
the inclusion of multiple trades and multi-organizational partnerships in the construction
industry, this research offers new insights into the impediments that still exist
systemically and obstruct the formation of an effective means of understanding the
impact of management styles at the macro, mezzo and micro levels.
Conflict analysis and the potential for resolution was the driving force for this
research, as this is an industry in a struggle to make safety a priority without undermining
fiscal gains. Safety cannot be seen as an obscure construct but instead, systemic models
that embrace an information loop that supports dialogue from the top-down and bottomup. This research emphasizes that certain leadership styles are more suited to engender
worker safety. Furthermore, both managers and workers consistently agree on the
importance of a jobsite free of unsafe acts, unsafe conditions or a combination of both,
while not yet fully aligned as a united front.
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Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study Entitled
CONSTRUCTION SAFETY: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF
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Joshua M. Estrin, MS
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Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304
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For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact:
Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB)
Nova Southeastern University
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790
IRB@nsu.nova.edu
What is the study about?
The purpose of this study is to evaluate how management addresses job site safety. While the
industry has made an effort to approach safety, the full potential to reduce the need to wait for the
system to fail in order to successfully take action that keeps the worker out of harm’s way has
been sorely under utilized.
Why are you asking me?
The reason for asking you to participate is to better understand how you view how safety is
addressed by your supervisor and how safe you personally feel on the job site. Approximately
300 people (Management and Workers) will be taking this survey.
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study?
This survey is 100% anonymous and voluntary. By agreeing to take part in this study you will be
asked to spend approximately 15 to 20 minutes answering a series of 16 questions. You are
expected to answer the questions honestly and to the best of your ability by following the
instructions.
Is there any audio or video recording?
None
What are the dangers to me?
While this research poses no likely dangers or risks to you, any study may have unknown or
unforeseeable risks. If you have any questions about the research, your research rights, please
contact [Joshua Estrin and/or Jason Campbell]. You may also contact the IRB at the numbers
indicated above with questions as to your research rights."
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Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study?
There are no direct benefits.
Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything?
There are no costs to you or payments made for participating in this study.
How will you keep my information private?
None of the questions in any of the surveys require information that could be used to identify you.
For a full explanation how the information in this survey is protected you may read the full
privacy policy here https://www.surveymonkey.com/mp/policy/privacy-policy/ .
What if I do not want to participate or I want to leave the study?
You have the right to leave this study at any time or refuse to participate. If you do decide to
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have a right to receive. If you choose to withdraw, any information collected about you before
the date you leave the study will be kept in the research records for 36 months from the
conclusion of the study and may be used as a part of the research.
If you have any questions or concerns regarding the protection of your answers you may contact
the Joshua Estrin, the lead researcher in this study at (954) 243-7436 or jestrin@nova.edu
Other Considerations:
If significant new information relating to the study becomes available, which may relate to your
willingness to continue to participate, this information will be provided to you by the investigator.
Voluntary Consent by Participant:
By checking the box, you indicate that
 this study has been explained to you
 you have read this document or it has been read to you
 your questions about this research study have been answered
 you have been told that you may ask the researchers any study related questions in the
future or contact them in the event of a research-related injury
 you have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB) personnel
questions about your study rights
 you are entitled to a copy of this form after you have read and signed it
you voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled CONSTRUCTION SAFETY: A
QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES ON
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